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dc.contributor.authorRauch, Daniel E.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:21.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:37Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:37Z
dc.date.issued2016-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol33/iss1/6
dc.identifier.contextkey9460916
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8234
dc.description.abstractGenerations of commentators have examined (and critiqued) standing doc­trine. The fiercest clash has turned on the question of "injury "-specifically, what type of grievance is sufficient to merit court consideration. Defining "in­ jury" is no easy task, and in recent years, substantial inquiry has focused on just what harms should qualify an individual as "injured." Subjective fear? Lost aesthetic enjoyment? Increased risk of death? And so on. Surely, these debates are of great importance. Yet up to this point, judges and scholars have almost all assumed an "injury binary": either an individual has received a hurt sufficient to qualify for standing, or she has not.
dc.titleFractional Standing
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:37Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol33/iss1/6
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1485&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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