Welcome to the Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. This repository provides open, global access to the scholarship of Yale Law School faculty and journals, as well as a selection of unique collections. 

  • Teaching at the Intersection of Federal Indian Law and Environmental Law Courses

    Torres, Gerald; Hammersley, Mia Montoya; Racehorse, Vanessa; Tanana, Heather; Padilla, Nadine (Vermont Law Review, 2024)
    A discussion of the important role of Federal Indian Law in the practice of environmental and natural resources law and guidance on incorporating this intersection into traditional environmental law courses and curricula.
  • Comstockery: How Government Censorship Gave Birth to the Law of Sexual and Reproductive Freedom, and May Again Threaten It

    Siegel, Reva; Ziegler, Mary (Yale Law Journal, 2025)
    With the overturning of Roe v. Wade, the antiabortion movement has focused on a new strategy: transforming the Comstock Act, a postal obscenity statute enacted in 1873, into a categorical ban on abortion--a ban that Americans never enacted and, as the movement recognizes, would never embrace today. Claims on the Comstock Act have been asserted in ongoing challenges to the approval of the abortion pill mifepristone, in litigation before the Supreme Court, and in the 2024 campaign for the presidency. This Article offers the first legal history of the Comstock Act that reaches from its enactment to its post-Dobbs reinvention. Revivalists read the Comstock statute as a plain-meaning, no-exceptions, nationwide abortion ban. In countering revivalist claims, this Article recovers a lost constitutional history of the statute that explains why its understanding of obscenity and of items prohibited as nonmailable has evolved so dramatically in the 150 years since the law was enacted. We show that the Comstock law was the first federal obscenity law to include writings and articles enabling contraception and abortion, condemning them along with erotica and sex toys as stimulants to illicit sex. At no point was this ban absolute. The law, by its terms and as enforced, policed obscenity rather than criminalizing health care. Even the judges who developed the most expansive Victorian interpretation of obscenity--authorizing censors to prosecute advocates for free love and voluntary motherhood--protected the doctor-patient relationship. The public's repudiation of this expansive approach to obscenity as "Comstockery"--as encroaching on democracy, liberty, and equality-- led to the statute's declining enforcement and to cases in the 1930s narrowing obscenity and expanding access to sexual education, contraception, and abortion. These developments were not only statutory; they were constitutional. From conflicts over Comstock's enforcement emerged popular claims on democracy, liberty, and equality in which we can recognize roots of modern free-speech law and the law of sexual and reproductive liberty lost to constitutional memory. Recovering this lost history changes our understanding of the nation's history and traditions of sexual and reproductive freedom.
  • Altering Rules: The New Frontier for Corporate Governance

    Sanga, Sarath; Rauterberg, Gabriel (Yale Journal on Regulation, 2025)
    Corporate law has taken a contractarian turn. Shareholders are increasingly contracting around its foundational rules—statutory rights, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, even the central role of the board—and Delaware courts are increasingly enforcing these contracts. In the one case where they did not, the legislature swiftly overruled the decision and adopted a new statutory provision permitting boards to completely cede their powers to a shareholder by contract. These developments have sparked a polarized debate, with some calling for a return to mandatory rules, while others push for total contractual freedom. We argue, however, that the best approach lies neither in rigid mandatory rules nor unchecked contractual freedom—but in recognizing the potential of corporate law’s altering rules. Altering rules define how parties can opt out of the default rules of governance. Our theory identifies corporate altering rules’ essential features, namely, whose consent is required to change a default (process) and who is bound by that decision (scope). We show that the central role of altering rules in corporate law is not simply to make changing a default more or less difficult, as is widely supposed, but rather to combine process and scope in ways that define distinct bargaining environments, shaping how insiders negotiate over governance. Corporate law can fine-tune these features in ways that both encourage contractual innovation and manage intra-corporate risks. In response to recent cases and legislation, we propose new altering mechanisms that will broaden decision-making to include non-signatory shareholders, protecting them from harmful externalities. Altering rules, as they exist now, represent only a fraction of their potential. Rethinking their design opens the door to a vast, largely unexplored landscape of possibilities that could guide corporate governance in its new era of contractual innovation.
  • The Capital of and the Investments in Courts, State and Federal

    Resnik, Judith (New York University Law Review, 2025)
    Longstanding constitutional commitments appear to ensure rights to remedies for "every person." Nonetheless, courts were once exclusionary institutions contributing to the maintenance of racialized status hierarchies. Twentieth-century civil rights movements pushed courts into recognizing the authority of diverse claimants to pursue their claims. These movements also succeeded in legislatures, which invested in making constitutional obligations real through statutory entitlements, jurisdictional grants, and funding for tens of hundreds of courthouses, judgeships, and staff. Courts thus became icons of government commitments to legal remedies, as well as battlegrounds about the authority of government to regulate power, both public and private. In this essay, I explore how the federal courts became the source of "our common intellectual heritage," why it is difficult to bring sustained attention to state courts, and why doing so has become pressing as economic inequalities in state and federal courts undermine adjudication's legitimacy. Many of the new rights-holders had limited resources. Asymmetries in dispute resolution make aspirations to provide fair and equal treatment difficult. Because courts are public sites, the disparities are patent—bringing to the fore the problems facing litigants and courts. For some, responses lie in augmenting the capacity of courts to make good on their promises as information-forcing, conflict-exposing, and information-disseminating institutions. For others, the goal is to limit access to courts and undercut the legitimacy of their processes and outcomes. Illustrative is "Judicial Hellholes," which is the name of a yearly publication attacking jurisdictions in which plaintiffs succeed in obtaining remedies. To clarify the normative stakes of conflicts over "rights to remedies" in "open" courts, I focus here on the infrastructure of state and of federal courts and data on users and needs. Filings in both federal and state courts have, in recent years, declined, while concerns about self-represented litigants and the inaccessibility of courts have risen. I argue that the legal academy needs to take on "class" (as in economic wherewithal) in courts and that Congress needs to provide fiscal support for both federal and state courts, on which enforcement of law depends, and I address the challenges of doing so.
  • Crisis and Change at the United Nations: Non-Amendment Reform and Institutional Evolution

    Hathaway, Oona; Mills, Maggie M.; Zimmerman, Heather (Michigan Journal of International Law, 2025)
    The Security Council’s inaction in response to the wars in Gaza and Ukraine has once again put a spotlight on structural problems at the United Nations (“U.N.”). Security Council paralysis—particularly the (mis)use of the veto power afforded to the permanent five (“P5”) members of the Council—has long prompted calls for reform. Yet the same veto power prevents nearly all efforts to reform the organization through the formal amendment process provided in the U.N. Charter. This article argues that there is an alternative way forward: what we call “non-amendment reform.” Rather than seek formal amendments that are unlikely to survive the veto of the P5 members, advocates of change should support change through evolving interpretations of the Charter. Non-amendment reform can provide a way for the United Nations to act in the face of a veto threat. Indeed, thanks to an earlier non-amendment reform, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, paralysis of the Security Council during the wars in Gaza and Ukraine has not prevented the United Nations from acting. Although non-amendment reform has been overlooked by scholars, it has long been critical to the capacity of the United Nations to respond to crises. This article demonstrates that a four-stage process—trigger, proposal, contestation leading to a new interpretation, and consolidation—has led to non-amendment reform at key moments throughout the United Nations’ history. Learning a lesson from the past, today’s advocates of change should channel their efforts towards non-amendment reform to enable the United Nations to meet the challenges of the moment. This article outlines four current opportunities to do just that.

View more