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Consumer Protection for Online Markets and Large Digital Platforms
Dinielli, David Scott Morton, Fiona M. Seim, Katja Sinkinson, Michael Fletcher, Amelia Crawford, Gregory S. Crémer, Jacques Heidhues, Paul Luca, Michael Salz, Tobias
Dinielli, David
Scott Morton, Fiona M.
Seim, Katja
Sinkinson, Michael
Fletcher, Amelia
Crawford, Gregory S.
Crémer, Jacques
Heidhues, Paul
Luca, Michael
Salz, Tobias
Collections
Abstract
Consumer-protection law is vital for ensuring that market-based economies work in the economic interest of consumers as well as businesses, and thus to the benefit of society as a whole. This is well understood.
Caveat emptor—“let the buyer beware”—may have made sense as the default risk allocation between buyer and seller in the village marketplaces of yore, in which transactions were relatively small, and buyers and sellers were likely to know and expect future dealings with each other. These features would naturally encourage traders to comply with community-generated and community-enforced norms of commercial fair dealing.1 In these admittedly idealized markets, sellers who cheated would quickly be found out, and they would face high social and economic costs, in contrast to the social and economic costs sellers face in modern markets, where traders are more likely to be strangers engaged in one-off transactions. The idealized markets of yore also dealt mostly in physical goods, which allowed buyers the opportunity to examine the goods before purchase.
Modern markets, especially online markets, differ from the idealized village marketplace in significant ways. The scope and scale of most contemporary online markets, for example, make it unrealistic to hope that relational obligations or a shared sense of morality could fully counterbalance incentives to cheat.