

Article

International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts

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I. INTRODUCTION

A deep puzzle lies at the heart of international law. It is “law” binding on the United States,¹ and yet it is not always enforceable in the courts. One of the

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1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).

great challenges for scholars, judges, and practitioners alike has been to make some sense of this puzzle—some might call it a paradox—and to figure out when international law can be used in U.S. courts and when it cannot.

The Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution would seem to solve this puzzle. It says, after all, that “Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be supreme Law of the Land.”² Yet early in the country’s history, the Supreme Court distinguished between treaties “equivalent to an act of the legislature”—and therefore enforceable in the courts—and those “the legislature should execute”—meaning they could not be enforced in the courts until implemented by Congress and the President.³ Thus began a cottage industry devoted to determining when international law was enforceable in the courts.

Just when scholars had more or less come to a settled understanding of the status of international law in the courts—or at least agreed to disagree—the Supreme Court reentered the fray. Beginning in the 1990s, foreign nationals convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death had begun challenging their convictions on the grounds that the arresting authorities had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations⁴ (Vienna Convention), which the United States had ratified, by failing to inform them that they had the right to contact their consulates.⁵ U.S. courts refused to provide the relief the foreign nationals sought, and two of the cases eventually made their way to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).⁶ That Court twice held that the United States had breached its obligations to its treaty partners by failing to notify the consulates of foreign nationals upon their arrest.⁷ In the second of these two cases,⁸ the Court held that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention by failing to inform fifty-one Mexican nationals of their rights under the Convention upon their arrest.⁹ The Court declared that the United States was obligated to provide the fifty-one individuals—including petitioner José Ernesto Medellín—“review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.”¹⁰

2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

3. *Foster v. Neilson*, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), *overruled on other grounds*, *United States v. Percheman*, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).

4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.

5. The first of these—presented to the Supreme Court in the context of a last-minute request for a stay of execution and a writ of certiorari—resulted in a *per curiam* decision in that Court declining to review the case on its merits. *Breard v. Greene*, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). The petitioner was therefore executed.

6. The United States had ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention, which provided that “Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.” Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.

7. *LaGrand Case* (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).

8. In the first case, the petitioner had been executed by the time the merits decision was handed down. *Id.* Thus no further proceedings occurred.

9. *Avena and Other Mexican Nationals* (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).

10. *Id.* at 51 (quoting *LaGrand*, 2001 I.C.J. 466, at 514).

Medellín returned to the U.S. courts to enforce the holding, seeking the review and reconsideration called for by the ICJ. The Texas courts refused—in part on the grounds that the ICJ’s decision was not directly enforceable in domestic courts. The U.S. Supreme Court surprised many observers by agreeing. In *Medellin v. Texas*,¹¹ the Court reasoned that the treaties granting jurisdiction to the ICJ were non-self-executing and thus not enforceable unless implemented into law by Congress. They were, in other words, among those treaties the legislature must execute.¹² Congress, of course, had not passed implementing legislation—probably because nearly everyone had long assumed that the treaties at issue were legally binding, making implementing legislation unnecessary.

A significant line in the decision was buried in the footnotes. In the now-famous third footnote, the Court endorsed a “background presumption” against finding that treaties confer private rights or private rights of action, even when they are self-executing.¹³ This represented a significant shift away from U.S. courts’ historical approach to interpreting treaties. Indeed, it effectively reversed what had, during most of the country’s history, been a background presumption *in favor* of finding treaties to confer private rights of action whenever they conferred private rights. The decision thus highlighted, and heightened, uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of treaties in the U.S. courts.

This Article examines the status of treaties in U.S. courts—and how the international legal commitments expressed in our treaties “come home”—in three interlocking steps. First, it seeks in Part I to provide an account of the legal and historical context of *Medellin*—examining both the case law that led up to the decision and how the lower courts have since responded. Even before the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, much had changed in the way the courts enforced treaties created under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.¹⁴ During the first 170 years of U.S. history, courts generally applied a strong presumption that private litigants could use treaties to press their claims in court. That all began to change just after World War II, as international treaties—and international human rights treaties in particular—proliferated. Still, the old presumption remained in place for certain categories of treaties. Understanding this transformation enables a deeper appreciation of the impact *Medellin* is already having, and will likely have in the future, on the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts.

Second, the Article aims in Part II to place direct enforcement of

11. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).

12. *Id.* at 514, 516.

13. *Id.* at 506 n.3.

14. Under Article II, the President is authorized to “make” treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur”). This Article focuses exclusively on Article II treaties. When it uses the term “international law,” it is referring only to such treaties. For more on executive agreements, see Oona A. Hathaway, *Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States*, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008) [hereinafter Hathaway, *Treaties’ End*], and Oona A. Hathaway, *Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance*, 119 YALE L. J. 141 (2009).

international law through private rights of action into broader context in a second way—by looking at *all* the ways in which international law can be enforced in U.S. courts. The direct enforcement of treaties called into doubt in the wake of *Medellin* is only a part of the picture. Treaties are enforced in U.S. courts in several other ways as well—through what we term “indirect enforcement,” “defensive enforcement,” and “interpretive enforcement.” These other ways of enforcing international commitments in U.S. courts are often ignored in the scholarly literature about judicial enforcement of international law. Many scholars treat one or the other in isolation, but no one considers them as a whole. As a result, advocates and critics of international law alike have placed too much emphasis on the use of international law as a cause of action for private litigants. This, in turn, has caused them to overestimate *Medellin*’s likely effect on the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts.

Finally, in Part III, this Article considers steps that can be taken to increase the likelihood that treaties will continue to be enforced directly, even in a post-*Medellin* world. We offer three proposals for how each of the branches of the federal government can strengthen the enforcement of international law. First, Congress could pass legislation providing for the judicial enforcement of certain subsets of Article II treaties. Second, the President and Senate could adopt a clear statement rule for treaty ratification—a practice through which the President submits treaties to the Senate for ratification with clear statements about whether they are self-executing, and through which the clear statement becomes part of the treaty’s formal text or accompanying documents. Third, the executive branch could pursue direct enforcement of treaty obligations itself. Where treaties are clear that private litigants lack rights of action, the U.S. government could bring affirmative lawsuits against state and municipal agencies that refuse to comply with treaties, to enjoin those entities from activities that place the United States in violation of its international obligations.

Our proposals each offer a path toward more effective enforcement of Article II treaties in U.S. courts. They are only valuable, of course, if the United States has an interest in abiding by the international legal commitments it makes.¹⁵ We recognize that there is an ongoing debate about this proposition.¹⁶ Although proving the proposition that it is in the United States’

15. Many scholars have argued that states have an interest in abiding by their international legal commitments, arriving at the same conclusion in quite different ways. *See, e.g.*, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, *AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY* (1984) (arguing that strong international institutions and international laws promote states’ individualistic objectives through facilitating cooperation); Andrew T. Guzman, *A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law*, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1849 (2002) (arguing that states should (and do) obey international legal commitments, such as treaty commitments, because “[a] country that develops a reputation for compliance with international obligations signals to other countries that it is cooperative. This allows the state to enjoy long-term relationships with other cooperative states, provides a greater ability to make binding promises, and reduces the perceived need for monitoring and verification”); Peter J. Spiro, *The New Sovereignists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets*, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000 (critiquing the “New Sovereignists” for failing to appreciate the benefits to states in general and the United States in particular of complying with international legal obligations).

16. For a critical view, see, for example, John R. Bolton, *Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?*, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 26-27 (2000) (arguing that treaties are

interest to abide by its international law commitments is not a goal of this Article, we note at least two reasons to believe it is true. First, when treaties provide reciprocal benefits, the United States clearly gains from the enforcement of the agreements by other parties to the treaty. Indeed, for the 4.5 million Americans who live overseas and the 60 million who traveled abroad last year¹⁷—not to mention the U.S. businesses whose trillions of dollars in investments are protected by a variety of international treaties—the ability to enforce treaty-based rights abroad is essential.¹⁸ But other countries are less likely to observe their treaty obligations if the United States fails to live up to its side of the bargain. A private right of action is often the best way to guarantee this compliance, for the federal judiciary is in a unique position to press the political branches to honor the country's international commitments, particularly when those commitments benefit individuals.¹⁹ Second, regardless of the value one may place on any given international agreement—or the benefit that the United States receives from that particular treaty—the United States has a broader and deeper interest in demonstrating its capacity to abide by the commitments it makes. Until the United States chooses to end an international legal commitment (which it ordinarily can do by simply providing notice to this effect), it is obligated to comply with the agreement as a matter of international law.²⁰ Failure to comply with such obligations makes the United States a law violator potentially subject to sanctions and—likely most harmful of all—an unreliable treaty partner.²¹ For these reasons, even those who dislike or disapprove of particular international agreements should wish to see the United States live up to the commitments that it has made.

not legally binding and the United States should be able to ignore its treaty obligations to promote its sovereign interests); Eric Posner, *Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?*, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1916 (2003) (“[W]hat I have said should be enough to cast doubt on the notion that states have a moral obligation to obey international law.”); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, *International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self Execution*, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589-91 (2003) (arguing that treaties should have diminished status domestically, until they are implemented by Congress, given “delegation” and democratic legitimacy concerns); Austen L. Parrish, *Reclaiming International Law from Extra-Territoriality*, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 822-27 (2009) (describing how “Sovereignists” are skeptical of international law and particularly of multilateral treaties, because such provisions undermine state sovereignty).

17. *Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad: Hearing on S. 11994 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 112th Cong., 1 (2011) (statement of Undersecretary Patrick F. Kennedy, U.S. Dep’t of State).

18. See, e.g., *id.* at 2-7 (explaining the importance of the rights to consular notification and access, protected by the Vienna Convention, for the thousands of Americans in foreign custody); cf. *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, at 524 (2008) (recognizing that the United States had “plainly compelling” interests in complying with its obligations under the Vienna Convention, such as “ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of international law”).

19. See William M. Carter, Jr., *Treaties as Law and the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power To Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation*, 69 MD. L. REV. 344, 359-80 (2010) (contending that federal courts should use their mandamus power to compel the U.S. government to comply with its human rights treaty obligations, even for non-self-executing treaties, because those treaties are still binding federal law under the Supremacy Clause).

20. Indeed, the most fundamental proposition of international law is *pacta sunt servanda*—agreements must be kept.

21. For more on this, see Oona A. Hathaway & Scott S. Shapiro, *Outcasting: The Enforcement of Domestic and International Law*, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011).

II. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT HOME

To understand modern jurisprudence on the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts, it is important to disentangle the meaning of “self-executing treaties,” “private rights,” and “private rights of action.” A *self-executing treaty* is a treaty that creates a domestic legal obligation in the absence of implementing legislation.²² A *private right* is a right that accrues to an individual.²³ A *private right of action*²⁴ allows a private party to seek a remedy from a court for the violation of a private right provided by a treaty.²⁵

Treaties that may be enforced in court by private litigants are often referred to as “self-executing” treaties. This is technically accurate, though it leads many to the incorrect assumption that treaties that are “self-executing” and those that create “private rights of action” are always one and the same. In fact, they are not. As the Restatement (Third) puts it: “[W]hether a treaty is self-executing is a question distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights or remedies.”²⁶

Although all treaties that create private rights of action are self-executing, not all self-executing treaties necessarily create private rights or private rights of action. For example, a treaty providing for military cooperation between two countries would likely create no private right, while a treaty involving contractual or property rights likely would. A treaty providing for the protection of civilians during times of armed conflict would confer new, private rights on such persons, but that treaty could be enforced in federal court only if there is a *private right of action* to bring lawsuits in federal court for violations of the treaty.²⁷

22. As the Court put it in *Medellin*, a treaty that is self-executing has “automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.” 552 U.S. at 505 n.2.

23. For example, a property right, such as that provided by the treaty at issue in *Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee*, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817).

24. The phrases “private cause of action” and “private right of action” will be used interchangeably throughout this Article.

25. For more on the distinction between private rights and private rights of action, see *McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 539 F.3d 485, 489-91 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that even though the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran is self-executing, creates a property right, and provides for a remedy, there is no implied private right of action); see also David Sloss, *When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas*, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 101-02 (2006) (noting that courts have found treaties to be judicially enforceable on behalf of private parties even when the treaty did not create an express private right of action). For an excellent article on international law enforcement in U.S. courts that touches on many of the same cases discussed here, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, *Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties*, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).

26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. h (1987).

27. For example, U.S. courts have not found the Geneva Conventions to provide a private right of action, even though they provide for “full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 726 F.2d 774, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (noting that the Geneva Conventions are not self-executing and do not provide a private right of action); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, *Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?*, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126-29 (2004) (noting that the majority of U.S. courts have held that the Geneva Conventions do not provide a private right of action). A recent bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Rwanda provides another example. As the Senate Report on the treaty put it: “The resolution of advice and consent contains a statement reflecting

Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the mid-twentieth century, however, made no distinctions among self-execution, private rights, and private rights of action. During this period, if a treaty dealt with the rights of private parties, it was generally treated as self-executing and the source of a private right of action.²⁸ This presumption became unsettled in the second half of the twentieth century. The lower courts adopted a less consistent approach to international agreements, as some began to look for express language stating that a treaty was self-executing or contemplated a private right of action for individuals. This newfound skepticism was likely prompted in part by the emergence of large numbers of human rights treaties—and growing concerns that these treaties could create private rights of action that would be pursued in U.S. courts.

In *Medellin*,²⁹ a majority of the Supreme Court endorsed in dicta a presumption *against* finding private rights or a private right of action. In a footnote, the Court explained that, “Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.”³⁰ Subsequent rulings by a number of lower courts have relied upon this dicta and the *Medellin* Court’s discussion of self-execution to reject a variety of treaty-based claims—thus, effectively flipping the presumption in favor of self-execution and a private right of action that prevailed for a century and a half to a presumption against. We trace this evolution below.

A. Founding to World War II

For most of the country’s history, the Supreme Court treated the issues of self-execution, private rights, and private rights of action as essentially indistinguishable.³¹ Between 1790 and 1947, the Court found a treaty self-executing on the basis that a private right was secured by the treaty in at least twenty-two cases.³² In each case, the Court held not only that the treaty was

the committee’s understanding of the extent to which this Treaty will be self-executing. This provides that Articles 3–10 of the Treaty are self-executing and do not confer private rights of action enforceable in United States courts.” S. REP. NO. 112-2, at 11 (2011), available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/reports/download/?id=05a8bf53-9828-49f9-99ef-dceaf5695afc>.

28. See John T. Parry, *Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties*, 32 *FORDHAM INT’L L.J.* 1209 (2008) (addressing the understandings of treaty implementation in the decades before *Foster*); David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, *The U.S. Supreme Court and International Law: Continuity and Change* 5 (Aug. 29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664773 (“The Supreme Court’s approach to treaties shows substantial continuity until the middle of the twentieth century, with substantial change after World War II . . . Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court routinely applied treaties to preempt state law. It also played an active role enforcing treaty rights on behalf of individuals, even against the federal government.”).

29. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter.

30. *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (citations omitted).

31. For an examination of the debate over self-execution that includes the pre-Founding British practice as well as the role of Congress in the debate, see Parry, *supra* note 28.

32. These cases are cited in Justice Breyer’s Appendix to *Medellin*. 552 U.S. at 568 app. A (Breyer, J., dissenting).

self-executing, but also that it created a private right of action. The treaties from which the Court inferred this right to private enforcement fell into four areas: (1) contract matters; (2) property and inheritance law matters; (3) the right to challenge the legality of detention through a writ of habeas corpus; and (4) rights to carry on a trade.

The reasoning of the Court throughout this period followed a consistent pattern: *if* the treaty created a private right—a property right, inheritance right, contract right, or habeas corpus right—*then* the treaty was “self-executing,” and there was *necessarily* a private right of action enabling individuals to enforce the right in the courts. The Court reasoned that a treaty conferring rights on private individuals did not “address itself”³³ to the legislature and therefore did not require congressional action to have effect. Rather, such treaties spoke to the judiciary, whose role it was to enforce individual rights under the treaties.³⁴

The Court’s approach during this era is exemplified by the seminal cases of *Ware v. Hylton*,³⁵ *Foster v. Neilson*,³⁶ and *United States v. Percheman*.³⁷ In *Ware*, the Court held that the Treaty of Peace, signed between the United States and Great Britain in 1783, enabled a British creditor to recover a debt owed to him by an American.³⁸ The Court reasoned that because the Peace Treaty created a private right for British creditors, it automatically gave rise to an implied private right of action. The treaty aimed to protect the contractual rights of British creditors, and the Court regarded judicial enforcement of that right as a necessary means to that end.³⁹

Just over three decades later, in *Foster v. Neilson*, the Supreme Court famously elaborated what we now know as the self-execution doctrine. The case presented the question of whether a plaintiff had property rights to a plot of land in Florida.⁴⁰ The plaintiff claimed he did, tracing his rights to a transfer of land ownership by the government of Spain in 1804. He further claimed that the Treaty of Amity, signed between the United States and Spain in 1819, solidified his property rights in the land. The defendant argued that Spain lacked the power to transfer land ownership in 1804, for it had already ceded its sovereignty over the territory in question to France, and France in turn had ceded its sovereignty to the United States. The Treaty of Amity was of no moment, the defendant claimed, because the initial land transfer was void.

In resolving the case, Chief Justice John Marshall distinguished between treaties “equivalent to an act of the legislature” and those “the legislature must execute.”⁴¹ The 1819 treaty, he concluded, fell into the latter category, because it contemplated future legislative action to put the land transfers to which it

33. *Foster v. Neilson*, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).

34. *Id.*

35. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).

36. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 253.

37. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).

38. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199.

39. *Id.* at 239 (“If a British subject . . . prosecuted his just right, it could only be in a court of justice.”).

40. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254.

41. *Id.* at 314.

referred into effect.⁴² The plaintiff could not vindicate his alleged property rights pursuant to the treaty.

This case may seem in tension with the presumption during this period in favor of self-execution of treaties that create private rights, but in fact it is not. In *Foster*, the central question was whether the 1819 treaty had created or preserved personal property rights in the first place, not whether such treaty-based rights could be enforced. The Court read the treaty to require additional legislative action before property rights could vest—in other words, the treaty on its own terms was not a source of private rights. Given that there was no private property right to enforce, there was certainly no private right of action that could be located in the treaty.

This reading finds support in *United States v. Percheman*, in which the Court came to the opposite conclusion regarding the same set of facts.⁴³ There, the Court revisited its earlier holding that the treaty at the heart of the contested property rights claims in Florida required legislative action to create private rights.⁴⁴ Contrary to its holding in *Foster*, the Court held that under customary international law and general canons of treaty interpretation, the 1819 treaty between Spain and the United States should be read as having preserved the preexisting property rights of Florida's inhabitants.⁴⁵ The Court explained that in *Foster*, it had not been presented with the Spanish version of the treaty.⁴⁶ After reading the Spanish version, the Court was convinced that the English version must be interpreted as self-executing to accord with the Spanish version.⁴⁷ Having now found that the treaty of cession did, in fact, preserve private property rights, the Court concluded that the treaty obligation to protect those rights was self-executing and that an individual could bring an action under the treaty.⁴⁸

The presumption in favor of finding treaties to be self-executing when they created private rights was applied consistently by the courts throughout the period of the Founding through the early twentieth century. When examined

42. Carlos Vázquez has explained that “the modern reader of *Foster* is left to infer that the Court concluded that Article 8 contemplated implementing legislation because the treaty employed action verbs (“ratify” and “confirm”) in the future tense.” Carlos M. Vázquez, *Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties*, in *INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES* 151, 168 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007).

43. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).

44. *Id.*

45. The treaty stated that “[a]ll the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818 by his catholic majesty, or his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by his majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands.” *Id.* at 88 (citation omitted).

46. *Id.* at 89.

47. *Id.*

48. *Id.* The Supreme Court expressly drew a similar distinction in *Fok Young Yo v. United States*, 185 U.S. 296 (1902). It explained that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1880, U.S.-China, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, which declared that the government could “regulate, limit, or suspend” the immigration of Chinese laborers into the United States “did not refer to the privilege of transit, and, as it was not self-executing, the act of May 6, 1882, was passed to carry the stipulation into effect.” *Fok Young Yo*, 185 U.S. at 303. By contrast, it explained, “the provision of this treaty applicable here, in recognizing the privilege of transit and providing that it should continue, proceeded on the ground of its existence and continuance under governmental regulations, and no act of Congress was required.” *Id.*

more closely, these cases give rise to an interesting pattern. As we show below, all of the cases involved treaties that created one of four types of private rights: contractual, property and inheritance, detention and habeas corpus, and the right to carry on a trade. These rights are traditional common law rights. This suggests that one likely reason courts were quick to infer that treaty-created rights could be enforced through private rights of action in U.S. courts is that the private rights were ones that had always been treated as judicially enforceable under the English common law. If that is true, it helps explain why courts were less willing to apply this same presumption, of self-execution, to the new treaties that emerged in the mid-twentieth century. The rest of this Section examines the treaties of the earlier period according to the four types of private rights they created, setting the stage for an examination of the evolution in the case law as the country entered the modern era.

1. *Contract*

In four cases during the two decades following the Founding, the Supreme Court held that the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain, signed after the Revolutionary War in 1783, created private contractual rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts.⁴⁹ The Treaty of Peace stated: "It is agreed, that creditors of either side should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all *bona fide* debts theretofore contracted."⁵⁰ No mention of rights of action or self-execution appeared in the text of the treaty. Nonetheless, when several states passed statutes expressly limiting the rights of British creditors to recover debts owed to them, the Supreme Court gave relief to British creditors under the Treaty. Time and again, the Court held that the Treaty of Peace of 1783 was the "supreme law of the land";⁵¹ that it took precedence over contrary state statutes;⁵² that it created a contract right for British creditors;⁵³ and, finally, that the contract right was enforceable in U.S. courts by private litigants.⁵⁴

2. *Property and Inheritance*

In eight cases between 1789 and 1890, the Supreme Court held that a treaty created a private property or inheritance right that was directly enforceable in U.S. courts.⁵⁵ In *Chirac v. Chirac's Lessee*, decided in 1817, for

49. *Hopkirk v. Bell*, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 456-57 (1806) ("This was a *bona fide* debt, contracted before the treaty—and the act of limitations is a legal impediment . . . the treaty says that the creditor shall meet with no legal impediment; and the constitution of the United States declares the treaty to be the *supreme* law of the land.—The act of limitations, therefore, must yield to the treaty."); *Hannay v. Eve*, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 242, 248-49 (1806); *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796) ("If a British subject . . . prosecuted his just right [under the Treaty], it could only be in a court of justice."); *Georgia v. Brailsford*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 2-3 (1794).

50. *Ware*, 3 U.S. at 204.

51. See, e.g., *Hopkirk*, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 457; *Ware*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 282-84.

52. See, e.g., *Hopkirk*, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 456-57; *Brailsford*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4.

53. See, e.g., *Ware*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 285.

54. See, e.g., *Hopkirk*, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 458; *Ware*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 285.

55. *De Geofroy v. Riggs*, 133 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1890) (holding that the U.S.-France Treaty of

example, the Court held that the 1778 Treaty of Amity between the United States and France created a private right for Frenchmen to hold and sell land in the United States. Accordingly, the Court allowed a Frenchman's heirs to invoke the treaty in a U.S. court to stop the deceased's estate from escheating to the government.⁵⁶ Two years later, in *Orr v. Hodgson*, the Supreme Court reached a similar holding with respect to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Britain, signed in 1783.⁵⁷ In *Orr*, the Court held that the U.S.-Britain treaty had created by its "express terms" a private right for British residents to acquire and pass on property by descent, and that this right was directly enforceable in court.⁵⁸

Although the treaties at issue in *Orr*, *Chirac*, and the other six cases decided by the Court in this period expressly created private property or inheritance rights, none explicitly created private rights of action in the courts of the United States. In each case, the Court inferred the rights of action once it found that the treaties were meant to create private rights.

3. Detention and Habeas Corpus

Three cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 1880s held that a treaty had endowed persons with a private right either to be released from detention or to file for habeas corpus review, when detained by authorities in violation of the treaty. The first was the 1884 case of *Chew Heong v. United States*,⁵⁹ in which a Chinese laborer who had traveled from the United States to Hawaii was detained upon attempting to reenter the United States. He filed a habeas petition challenging his detention, arguing that it violated an express provision of a treaty between the United States and China granting laborers the

1853 created a private right for French residents in the United States to pass on property and for the heirs to claim that property, and that these rights were enforceable in state court); *Hauenstein v. Lynham*, 100 U.S. 483, 484, 486, 490 (1879) (holding that the U.S.-Swiss Confederation Treaty of 1850 created a private right of Swiss residents to "withdraw and export the proceeds [of their land] . . . without difficulty" if those persons were domiciled in a state that did not allow foreigners to take property "by descent or inheritance," and that it is was the U.S. court's "duty to give [those rights] full effect"); *United States v. Percheman*, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (holding that the U.S.-Spanish treaty of cession for the state of Florida preserved the property rights of Florida's inhabitants and made those rights enforceable by private rights of action); *United States v. Arredondo*, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832) (also holding that the U.S.-Spanish treaty of cession preserved property rights of inhabitants of Florida); *Orr v. Hodgson*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819); *Chirac v. Chirac's Lessee*, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817) (*see infra* note 56); *Martin v. Hunter's Lessee*, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the U.S.-Britain Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 1794 created private rights for a British Lord in the United States to devise his land); *United States v. Schooner Peggy*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (holding that the U.S.-French Treaty of 1801 created a private right of action and stating that "where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress.").

56. *Chirac*, 15 U.S. at 270-71 ("[W]e are all of opinion that the treaty between the United States and France, ratified in 1778, enabled the subjects of France to hold lands in the United States. That treaty [also] declared that . . . 'They may, by testament, donation, or otherwise, dispose of their goods . . . and their heirs, subjects of the said United States, whether residing in France or elsewhere, may succeed them *ab intestat*'").

57. *Orr*, 17 U.S. at 453.

58. *Id.* at 463 ("[H]er title was completely confirmed, free from the taint of alienage; and that by the express terms of the treaty, it might lawfully pass to her heirs." (emphasis added)).

59. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).

right to “go and come of their own free will.”⁶⁰ The Supreme Court agreed and ordered his release from detention.⁶¹

Two years later, in *United States v. Rauscher*,⁶² the Supreme Court considered whether to order the release of a detainee who had been extradited and detained for a crime *not* specified in the extradition treaty between the United States and Britain under which he had been extradited.⁶³ The Court concluded that it was obligated to order the prisoner’s release. The *Rauscher* case is particularly interesting because it involved several steps of inferential reasoning by the Court. First, it located a private right of detainees to be free of charges for crimes not specified in the extradition treaty.⁶⁴ Next, it located a private right of action, because the treaty was “supreme law of the land, of which the courts are bound to take judicial notice, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of that treaty.”⁶⁵ Accordingly, the Court concluded that any detainee “restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States” may seek a writ of habeas corpus. If his allegations were found to be “well founded, he w[as] be discharged.”⁶⁶

The Court came to a similar conclusion in 1887 in *Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail*.⁶⁷ There, the Supreme Court held that a bilateral treaty between the United States and Belgium created a private right to be free of detention in the United States for crimes not covered by the treaty.⁶⁸ The treaty was “the supreme law of the United States.”⁶⁹ The defendant could, therefore, “enforce his rights under the treaty by writ of habeas corpus in any proper court of the United States.”⁷⁰

4. Right to “Carry on Trade”

In *Asakura v. City of Seattle*, decided in 1924, the Supreme Court considered whether a Seattle city ordinance prohibiting noncitizens from obtaining a business license violated a treaty between the United States and Japan.⁷¹ The Treaty of Amity between the United States and Japan provided that “[t]he citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall

60. *Id.* at 538-39, 542.

61. *Id.* at 560.

62. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).

63. *Id.* at 430-32.

64. *Id.* at 418 (“[A] treaty may . . . confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute.” (quoting the *Head Money Cases*, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)).

65. *Id.* at 419.

66. *Id.* at 431.

67. 120 U.S. 1 (1887).

68. *Id.* at 17. The treaty, the Court explained, gave “the consul of Belgium exclusive jurisdiction over the offense which it [was] alleged ha[d] been committed.” *Id.*

69. *Id.*

70. *Id.*

71. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).

have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade.”⁷² The plaintiff, relying on the treaty, sued to enjoin the enforcement of the Seattle ordinance.⁷³ Without addressing the question directly, the Court inferred a private right of action from the text of the treaty. The Court noted that the treaty was one of many treaties meant to provide for “the protection of the citizens of one country residing in the territory of another.” It then concluded that the treaty “operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts.”⁷⁴ The Court enjoined the enforcement of the ordinance against the plaintiff.⁷⁵

B. *World War II to Medellín*

In the period following World War II, both the Supreme Court’s approach and the approach of the lower federal courts towards the enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts was less consistent than it had been in the prior century and a half.⁷⁶ The courts continued to regard treaties benefitting private parties as self-executing and capable of being enforced by those parties through lawsuits. But they began taking a more skeptical approach toward treaties regulating relationships between sovereign states, as well as toward treaties regulating the relationship between the state and the individual. This shift, we shall see, may be traced at least in part to a backlash against the emerging human rights revolution and the threat some feared it posed to racial segregation and Jim Crow.

1. *The Presumption in Favor of Enforcement Weakens*

The Supreme Court—which has exercised control over its own docket through certiorari jurisdiction since the 1920s—did not choose to address many cases involving the enforcement of international treaties during the post-World War II period. In those it did accept, it began to develop a less consistent approach to treaty enforcement than it had applied in the previous 150 years. It continued to consider a number of treaties—particularly those affecting economic or commercial relations between individuals and those addressing transnational liability or litigation—self-executing and capable of direct enforcement in U.S. courts. It reached such judgments in cases involving aircraft liability treaties,⁷⁷ a multilateral convention concerning ship-owners’

72. *Id.* at 340 (quoting the Treaty of Amity, U.S.-Japan, Apr. 5, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504).

73. *Id.*

74. *Id.* at 341.

75. *Id.* at 343.

76. *Cf.* Sloss et al., *supra* note 28, at 8 (“[A]s late as 1945 the Court’s approach to treaties remained generally consistent with its approach over the previous 150 years. After the Second World War, however, the Court’s application of treaties as judicially enforceable law changed substantially. The Court continued vigorously to apply treaties regulating relationships among private parties. But in contrast to earlier periods, the Court declined to use treaties as an instrument to justify judicial supervision of the political branches in the exercise of their public functions.” (citation omitted)).

77. *See, e.g.*, *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.*, 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (“[T]he Convention is a self-executing treaty. Though the Convention permits individual signatories to

liability,⁷⁸ a treaty governing international discovery rules,⁷⁹ and several bilateral treaties setting forth protections for investors and inheritors.⁸⁰ Yet the Court adopted a newly skeptical posture to other types of treaties. The Court was hesitant to declare that the treaty provided a private right of action in cases that turned on the new International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),⁸¹ an extradition treaty with human rights implications,⁸² and treaties regulating the maritime industry on the high seas.⁸³

The Supreme Court did not offer the lower courts a consistent standard by which to judge which treaties should be treated as self-executing and giving rise to a private right of action and which should not. Left without clear guidance, the lower federal courts developed a bifurcated approach to treaty enforcement that reflected and amplified the Supreme Court's approach.⁸⁴ Like the Supreme Court, lower courts continued to infer a private right of action for treaties that involved economic or commercial relations.⁸⁵ But they began

convert liability limits into national currencies by legislation or otherwise, no domestic legislation is required to give the Convention the force of law in the United States.”) For similar cases assuming aircraft liability treaties to be self-executing, see *Olympic Airways v. Husain*, 540 U.S. 644, 649, 657 (2004); *El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng*, 525 U.S. 155, 161-63, 176 (1999); and *Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.*, 516 U.S. 217, 221, 231 (1996).

78. *United States v. Warren*, 340 U.S. 523, 526 (1951) (holding that Article 2 of the Shipowners' Liability Convention was self-executing and that “no Act of Congress is necessary to give [it] force”).

79. *Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court*, 482 U.S. 522, 524, 533 (1987) (describing international discovery rules).

80. See, e.g., *Kolovrat v. Oregon*, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (concerning an 1881 treaty between the United States and Serbia that regulated the property rights of citizens of each country); *Clark v. Allen*, 331 U.S. 503, 507 (1947) (concerning the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany and the testamentary disposition of realty and personality); see also *Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano*, 457 U.S. 176, 181, 189-90 (1982) (assuming in dicta that a Friendship, Navigation and Commerce treaty between the United States and Japan is self-executing and confers private rights of action for parties whose rights under the treaty are violated).

81. *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (holding that the ICCPR is not self-executing and does not confer a private cause of action: “[A]lthough the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”).

82. *United States v. Alvarez-Machain*, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that a U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty did not confer the private right not to be abducted to stand trial for a crime not specified).

83. *Argentine Republic v. Amerasia Shipping Co.*, 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989) (“Respondents point to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention. These conventions, however, only set forth substantive rules of conduct and state that compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs. They do not create private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in United States courts” (citations omitted)).

84. Previous work has noted the shifting presumption at the lower court level. See Sloss, *supra* note 25, at 106-10 (finding that beginning around the 1970s, many lower courts created a novel assumption that treaties do not confer private rights of action).

85. *BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petoleos de Ecuador*, 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2003) (concerning the Convention for International Sale of Goods and holding that the treaty “creates a private right of action in federal court”); *Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex Corp.*, 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995) (concerning the Convention for the International Sale of Goods); *Choi v. Kim*, 50 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1995) (concerning the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and The Republic of Korea); *Vagenas v. Cont'l Gin Co.*, 988 F.2d 104, 106 (11th Cir. 1993) (concerning the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Greece); *Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta*, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (concerning the Treaty

taking a more skeptical approach toward treaties regulating relationships between sovereign states (such as international dispute settlement and international use of force) and those regulating the relationship between the state and individual (most notably the emerging body of human rights treaties and international criminal law regimes).⁸⁶ Furthermore, when federal courts of appeal concluded there was no private right of action, they did so on one of two grounds: (1) either the treaty was not self-executing, and thus not judicially enforceable,⁸⁷ or (2) regardless of whether the treaty was self-executing, it was not intended to benefit private individuals in the first place, and therefore did not give rise to a private right of action.⁸⁸

of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Ireland); *Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 502 F.2d 90, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1974) (concerning the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands); *Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Dade Cty., Fla. v. Aerolineas Peruanas, S.A.*, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962) (concerning the Convention on International Civil Aviation).

86. See *infra* notes 87-88.

87. *United States v. Casaran-Rivas*, 311 F. App'x 269, 272 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ny argument that the indictment violated the refugee Convention and CAT [Convention Against Torture] Treaty is without merit, as the Refugee Convention and CAT Treaty are not self-executing, or subject to relevant legislation, and, therefore, do not confer upon aliens a private right of action to allege a violation of their terms.”); *Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales*, 423 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (“This declaration [that the ICCPR is not self-executing] means that the provisions of the ICCPR do not create a private right of action or separate form of relief enforceable in United States courts.”); *Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.*, 414 F.3d 233, 257 n.35 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the ICCPR does not create a private right of action because the Senate declared that it is not self-executing); *Igartua De La Rosa v. United States*, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same); *Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States*, 967 F.2d 965, 969 (4th Cir. 1992) (“In sum, we hold that the Hague Convention is not self-executing and, therefore, does not, by itself, create a private right of action for its breach.”); *Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, 761 F.2d 370, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The provisions of the United Nations Charter on which plaintiff relies are Articles 55 and 56. We have found no case holding that the U.N. Charter is self-executing nor has plaintiff provided us with one Articles 55 and 56 do not create rights enforceable by private litigants in American courts.”); *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 726 F.2d 774, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (equating the issues of self-execution and private rights of actions and stating that the treaties which plaintiffs sought to enforce were not self-executing).

88. *United States v. Rommy*, 506 F.3d 108, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2007) (concerning a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the Netherlands and holding that the petitioner “cannot demonstrate that the treaty creates any judicially enforceable individual right that could be implicated by the government’s conduct here”); *In re Iraq and Afg. Detainees Litig.*, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2007) (concerning the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: “None of the provisions of Geneva Convention IV contain any such express or implied language indicating that persons have individual ‘rights’ that may be enforced under the treaty. . . . [t]he provisions of Geneva Convention IV state general obligations with regard to the treatment of protected persons that are imposed on signatory States.”); *United States v. Jimenez-Nava*, 243 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2001) (concerning the Vienna Convention: “A strong argument has been made that . . . the Vienna Convention is not ambiguous as to whether it creates private rights. [cites *Li*] . . . In any event . . . even if the treaty is ambiguous, the presumption against implying private rights comes into play. . . . [T]he U.S. State Department has consistently taken the position that the Vienna Convention does not establish rights of individuals, but only state-to-state rights and obligations.”); *Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan*, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Article 94 of the U.N. Charter [concerning compliance with ICJ decisions] simply does not confer rights on private individuals. Treaty clauses must confer such rights in order for individuals to assert a claim ‘arising under’ them.”); *United States v. Mann*, 829 F.2d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The [Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs] and letter agreement do not appear to create any individual right in Mann. The letter agreement merely recognizes the ability of signatory states to request records from financial institutions in other signatory states.”); *United States v. Conroy*, 589 F.2d 1258, 1268 (5th Cir. 1979) (concerning the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and holding that “redress for improper seizure in foreign waters is not due to the owner or crew of the vessel involved, but to the foreign government whose territoriality has been infringed by the action”); *Dreyfus v. Von Flick*, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that neither the Hague Convention, the Kellogg-Briand Pact nor the Treaty of

Several cases illustrate the bifurcated approach of the lower courts to treaty enforcement, during the post-War period. *Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co.*⁸⁹ exemplifies the courts' adherence to the old presumptions about private rights, self-execution, and private rights of action, for treaties dealing with economic or commercial obligations.⁹⁰ In *Vagenas*, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether to permit Greek creditors to enforce a Greek court judgment against an American debtor pursuant to a Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) Treaty between Greece and the United States.⁹¹ FCNs are a common category of bilateral treaty that states enter in order to foster trade and investment. The FCN between Greece and the United States had mandated that U.S. courts treat Greek litigants in a nondiscriminatory manner "with respect to access to the courts of justice."⁹² In resolving the case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the FCN not only granted Greek citizens private rights, but rights that were directly enforceable. Namely, the FCN endowed Greek citizens with rights of equal treatment in U.S. courts—and this meant they could avail themselves of the statute of limitations provided for in Greek courts, just as a U.S. citizen would have when seeking to enforce a sister state court judgment.⁹³

By contrast, in cases involving treaties governing relationships between sovereign states (particularly dispute settlement), the courts were less willing to find that the treaty created a private right or a private right of action. In *Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan*, for example, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Article 94 of the U.N. Charter—which provides that members of the United Nations "undertak[e] to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party"—endowed U.S. citizens with the ability to bring a lawsuit enjoining the American government's funding of the Contras in Nicaragua.⁹⁴ The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did not: Article 94 did not create a private right of action in U.S. courts, because the treaty did not create rights at all. This conclusion was grounded in a close reading of Article 94's text, as well as consideration of the U.N. Charter's purpose.⁹⁵

Versailles "conferred any private rights with regard to such property which were enforceable in American courts"); *Diggs v. Richardson*, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (concerning a U.N. Security Council resolution: "[W]e find that the provisions here in issue were not addressed to the judicial branch of our government. They do not by their terms confer rights upon individual citizens; they call upon governments to take certain action.").

89. 988 F.2d at 104.

90. In a similar case, *Columbia Marine Services, Inc. v. Reffet Ltd.*, the Second Circuit considered a claim brought under a tax treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom that exempted English insurers from federal excise taxes on insurance premiums. 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988). The Court agreed that the treaty eliminated the tax, but not on the plaintiff in the case: "[T]he Treaty was designed expressly to eliminate the tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers" and thereby eliminate "double taxation." *Id.* at 20-21.

91. See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Greece, Aug. 3, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057. Today these matters are generally addressed through bilateral investment treaties or trade agreements, though more than thirty such agreements remain in force between the United States and partner countries.

92. 988 F.2d at 106.

93. *Id.*

94. 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

95. *Id.* at 937. As in most federal appeals court cases involving treaty claims during the

The lower courts also turned a newly skeptical eye on treaties regulating the relationship between the state and individuals within the state. In several cases, the courts found that human rights treaties were not self-executing, due to an express declaration by the United States stating they would not be directly enforced.⁹⁶ Moreover, this critical assessment extended even to a variety of treaties that did not contain such express declarations. In *In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation*,⁹⁷ for example, the D.C. District Court considered whether to enforce the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.⁹⁸ The court concluded that “[n]one of the provisions of Geneva Convention IV contain any such express or implied language indicating that persons have individual ‘rights’ that may be enforced under the treaty.”⁹⁹ That was true despite the fact that the treaty was expressly meant—by its very title, no less—to provide protections for civilian persons in time of war.

Similarly, in *Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States*,¹⁰⁰ the Fourth Circuit considered a claim that the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land imposed a duty on the United States to provide protection for residents of an occupied territory. The appellants argued that the purpose of the Hague Convention was to “codify international law regarding the treatment of civilians” and that “[t]he direct beneficiaries of the treaty [we]re civilians.”¹⁰¹ Accordingly, the Hague Convention had to be deemed to “provid[e] a direct avenue of relief” to aggrieved civilians in U.S. courts, because otherwise the United States would enjoy unchecked discretion in complying with the directives of the Treaty.¹⁰² The court, however, concluded that the treaty “does not explicitly provide for a privately enforceable cause of action.”¹⁰³ As a result, it was “not self-executing and, therefore, does not, by

postwar period, the court engaged in a fine-grained and detailed analysis of the treaties at issue. It did not invoke a presumption against the treaty’s enforceability that the plaintiff had to overcome. Instead, it considered whether a treaty created a private right and was self-executing—and thus produced a private right of action—by embarking on a multifactor analysis of the treaty’s text, history, and context. This method of analysis was captured by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law published in 1987. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(4) cmt. h & rep. n.4 (1987).

96. *Renkel v. United States*, 456 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Renkel argues that the Government violated her rights under the Convention Those Articles [of the Convention Against Torture (CAT)] are not, however, expressly self-executing.”); *Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales*, 423 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] came with attached RUDs [reservations, understandings, and declarations] declaring that the ICCPR is not self-executing. This declaration means that the provisions of the ICCPR do not create a private right of action or separate form of relief enforceable in United States courts.” (emphasis added)); *Saint Fort v. Ashcroft*, 329 F.3d 191, 202 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Saint Fort’s claims do not rest solely on a treaty that is not self-executing; they rest on the CAT through the FARRA and the regulations.”).

97. 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2007).

98. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, *supra* note 27.

99. 479 F. Supp. 2d at 116.

100. 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1992).

101. Brief for Appellant at 26, *Goldstar (Panama), S.A. v. United States*, 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1985) (No. 91-2229), 1991 WL 11246241 at *26.

102. *Id.*

103. 967 F.2d at 968.

itself, create a private right of action for its breach."¹⁰⁴

2. *The Bricker Backlash*

In the post-World War II period, the courts increasingly turned a skeptical eye on treaties regulating relations between sovereign states and between states and individuals, largely abandoning the presumption in favor of enforcement that they had used so routinely in earlier years. At the same time, they continued to apply the earlier presumption to treaties involving economic or commercial relations and those expressly addressing transnational liability or litigation. Why this shift? We argue it can be traced at least in part to changes in the nature of the treaties creating individual rights during this period and the response to that shift among the political branches and the public. The global human rights revolution and the very public backlash against it provoked increased scrutiny of treaties that could provide a mechanism by which individuals could challenge government policies. This, in turn, led to greater wariness among the courts to find that such treaties created private rights of action in U.S. courts.

As we have seen, in the period from the Founding through the mid-twentieth century, the majority of U.S. treaties that created private rights were private law treaties, primarily concerning contract and property rights. In the period following World War II, the treaties to which the United States was a party and those being litigated in U.S. courts increasingly concerned human rights and public law issues. The United States ratified the U.N. Charter in 1945,¹⁰⁵ which included Article 92 establishing the International Court of Justice;¹⁰⁶ signed the Genocide Convention in 1948;¹⁰⁷ ratified the four Geneva Conventions by 1955;¹⁰⁸ ratified the Vienna Convention in 1963,¹⁰⁹ and joined many other human rights treaties throughout the Cold War period.¹¹⁰

Courts were less familiar with these newer treaties and were wary of inferring private rights of action to enforce them. Even more important than

104. *Id.* at 969.

105. U. N. Charter, 59 Stat. 1033, T.S. No. 993 (1945).

106. *Id.* art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993. In 1946, the U.S. declared that it recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ over various matters, see United States Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, 1 U.N.T.S. 9, but it withdrew from general ICJ jurisdiction in 1985, following the *Nicaragua* case, *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)*, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). See Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of State, to Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General, United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985), cited in *Medellin v. Texas*, 555 U.S. 491, 500 (2008).

107. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention until 1988.

108. *E.g.*, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, *supra* note 27.

109. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, *supra* note 4.

110. See, *e.g.*, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, *opened for signature* Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The United States signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1977, but did not deposit its instrument of ratification until June 8, 1992. See United Nations Treaty Collection, <http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx> (last visited November 20, 2011).

their novelty, however, was the nature of the individual rights they created and the political context these new treaties entered. American Bar Association President Frank Holman illustrated the irrational fears these treaties provoked when he asserted (incorrectly) that if a white person driving through Harlem were to accidentally run over a black child, the driver could be extradited to an international tribunal or foreign court on charges of genocide.¹¹¹ Holman's views were extreme but influential. John Foster Dulles was later quoted as cautioning against the "trend toward trying to use the treaty-making power to effect internal social changes."¹¹² During the debate over the amendment, *Time Magazine* speculated that "the fight arose" because of concerns similar to Dulles's.¹¹³ It cited, in particular, the U.N. Charter, which required that states respect rights "without distinction as to race," and what it said was the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide to include "'causing . . . mental harm' to members of a 'national, ethnical, racial or religious group.'"¹¹⁴

The emergence of human rights treaties during the postwar period thus generated a backlash, particularly among those who feared the human rights treaties might be used to challenge Jim Crow laws in the South. This backlash led to the proposal of what came to be known as the "Bricker Amendment" in the 1950s, a series of constitutional amendments proposed in the Senate with the goal of effectively reversing the Supremacy Clause—not just for human rights treaties but for all treaties. In the end, the Amendment was defeated by a single vote.¹¹⁵

It is often said that judges read the newspapers, and this was no exception. Though the Bricker Amendment failed, the courts got the message. The controversy surrounding the debate over international law and the new and growing body of treaty law—including human rights treaties—underscored the political backlash in the United States against treaties that could lead to challenges to domestic laws, norms and institutions through private lawsuits. Courts thus began scrutinizing such claims with greater caution—and growing skepticism. This initial shift in the courts' approach was later codified in the Second and Third Restatements of Foreign Relations Law in 1965 and 1987. The Second Restatement did not expressly address private rights of action, but stated that a treaty "has immediate domestic effect as the supreme law of the land . . . only if it is self-executing."¹¹⁶ The Third Restatement went further and

111. DUANE TANANBAUM, *THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP* 13 (1988).

112. *The Bricker Amendment: A Cure Worse than the Disease?*, *TIME*, July 13, 1953, at 20.

113. *Id.*

114. *Id.* at 21. Several prominent black intellectuals and leaders also saw the promise of human rights agreements for advancing the civil rights struggle in the United States. CAROL ANDERSON, *EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955* (2003); WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE NEGRO PEOPLE (William L. Patterson ed., 1951).

115. See Hathaway, *Treaties' End*, *supra* note 14, at 1303.

116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 141 cmt. a (1965). David Sloss implies that after the publication of section 141 in the Second Restatement, courts were also more likely to find that treaties were not self-executing. According to Sloss, the Second Restatement provided doctrinal support for the notion that "treaty makers have an affirmative power to decide that a ratified

provided that “[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts, but there are exceptions with respect to both rights and remedies.”¹¹⁷ These Restatements reflected—and, indeed, encouraged—a growing tendency in the federal courts to insist on express evidence in the treaty or its legislative history that it was intended to be enforceable in domestic courts.

Still, even in the years leading up to *Medellin*, the federal courts’ growing reluctance to employ a presumption in *favor* of private rights of action had not resulted in a consistent and uniform presumption *against* them. Rather, the lower courts generally looked to the text and the history of the ratification process to determine whether a treaty was meant to be self-executing, to give rise to a private right, or to create a private right of action. Moreover, lower courts tended to maintain the presumption in favor of private rights of action for bilateral treaties and for treaties protecting private, common law rights.¹¹⁸ It was these last two threads of the earlier framework that *Medellin* would cut.

C. After Medellín

Although it had long been assumed that the treaties granting jurisdiction to the ICJ constituted binding federal law in the United States, the Supreme Court held in *Medellin* that they were non-self-executing. Thus, *Medellin* could not rely on them to enforce the *Avena* judgment requiring review and reconsideration of his sentence. In the course of its decision, the Supreme Court endorsed what it characterized as a “background presumption” against finding that treaties confer private causes of action.¹¹⁹ In what has become influential dicta, the Court stated, “Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.”¹²⁰ This statement by the *Medellin* Court appears to suggest that the presumption against finding a private right of action had previously been universally applied, which, as we have seen, is not the case.

Despite its inaccuracy and status as dicta, the blanket statement by the *Medellin* Court has led to a significant shift in U.S. courts’ approach to Article II treaties. No longer is the presumption against private rights of action applied

treaty will not be converted into primary domestic law, even though there are no constitutional impediments to automatic conversion.” David Sloss, *Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy*, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). Sloss argues the “Constitution does not give the treaty makers a power to shape primary domestic law directly” and the Restatement doctrine is therefore flawed because “it is founded upon an erroneous assumption about the treaty makers’ constitutional powers.” *Id.*; see also David Sloss, *Schizophrenic Treaty Law*, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 15, 19 (2007) (describing the differences between “transnationalist” and “nationalist” canons of interpretation in determining whether treaties are self-executing).

117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907 cmt. a (1987).

118. See *supra* note 85.

119. *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008).

120. *Id.* (citations omitted).

exclusively to public law treaties. Instead, as we shall show, lower courts are treating it as universal. After *Medellin*, the courts have begun applying the opposite presumption of that used by the courts during most of the country's history. Instead of presuming that treaties that create private rights necessarily create private rights of action, courts now generally presume that they do not, regardless of the type of treaty.

This will likely come as a surprise to many. Immediately after *Medellin* was decided by the Supreme Court, the leading scholars in the field mused that the decision *did not* support a strong presumption against finding private rights of action in treaties and that it would not significantly change the interpretation of treaties previously understood to be self-executing.¹²¹ In 2009, the American Bar Association and the American Society of International Law adopted a joint task force report that concluded that *Medellin's* "self-execution analysis may affect a limited class of treaties or a very substantial number," and it was too early to tell.¹²² Today, almost four years after *Medellin*, it appears that the more dire predictions have come true. It is now abundantly clear that *Medellin* has begun to make a difference in the interpretation of treaties in two key respects that we detail below. For those who regard the legal enforceability of Article II treaties as in the country's best interests,¹²³ these trends in treaty interpretation resulting from *Medellin* should be deeply troubling.

1. *A Presumption Against Private Rights of Action*

Medellin has changed the nature of U.S. courts' treaty analysis, leading them increasingly to adopt a strong presumption that treaties are neither self-executing nor protective of private rights, and thus do not give rise to private rights of action. This shift is evident in the lower federal courts' decisions in the nearly four years since the Supreme Court's decision.

Consider, for example, the Second and Eleventh Circuits' decisions in *Mora v. New York*¹²⁴ and *Gandara v. Bennett*.¹²⁵ Both *Mora* and *Gandara* concerned whether plaintiffs could be awarded damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for state officials' violations of their rights under the Vienna Convention. The plaintiffs in each case claimed that after being arrested for various criminal offenses in New York and Georgia, respectively, state law enforcement officials had failed to inform them of their rights to consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention and as a result, the plaintiffs had inadequate counsel and were sentenced to unfair periods of incarceration.

121. *E.g.*, Curtis A. Bradley, *Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties*, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 540-41 (2008) ("[S]ome commentators may claim that the decision supports a strong presumption *against* self-execution, and that as a result many treaties that would formerly have been treated as self-executing will now be treated as non-self-executing. A careful reading of the decision suggests that this is not a fair construction.").

122. AM. BAR ASS'N & AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW JOINT TASK FORCE ON TREATIES IN U.S. LAWS, REPORT 2 (2009) [hereinafter ABA/ASIL Report], available at <http://www.asil.org/files/TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf>.

123. See *supra* notes 17-21 and accompanying text.

124. 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008).

125. 528 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2008).

Neither plaintiff sought to sue under the Vienna Convention directly. They instead claimed that section 1983 provided them with a private right of action for the treaty violation.

Both the *Mora* and *Gandara* Courts refused to let the cases proceed, holding that even if section 1983 supplied a private cause of action, the Vienna Convention did not give rise to private rights in the first place. In *Mora*, the Second Circuit oriented its analysis entirely around the principles articulated in dicta in *Medellin*'s footnote three. The court explained that "international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights"¹²⁶ and that "'treaties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary.'"¹²⁷ Therefore, the court could not enforce the treaty-based claim.¹²⁸ The *Gandara* panel, like the *Mora* court, oriented its majority opinion around "the general rule . . . that '[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights,'" although it cited to the Restatement rather than to *Medellin* for this point.¹²⁹

In another recent case, *Toor v. Holder*,¹³⁰ the D.C. District Court similarly extended the *Medellin* dicta's presumption against inferring private rights of action to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.¹³¹ A Canadian citizen serving a sentence in U.S. federal prison brought suit against the Attorney General, claiming that the U.S. Department of Justice had prevented him from applying to transfer to a Canadian prison as he was authorized to do under the Convention. The district court resolved the case in one fell swoop by adopting a presumption against private rights and private rights of action. It stated that "'[i]nternational agreements . . . generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts,'"¹³² and concluded that "[s]ince the Convention has no express language to rebut a presumption against a private right of action, plaintiff lacks standing to sue under the treaty or its implementing statute."¹³³ The new *Medellin*-inspired presumption against private rights of action thus appears to have been decisive.

126. *Mora*, 524 F.3d at 200 (quoting *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008)).

127. *Id.* at 201 (quoting *Medellin*, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3).

128. Two years later, relying on its decision in *Mora* and the Supreme Court's decision in *Medellin*, the Second Circuit quickly concluded that, as a matter of first impression, the International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) did not give rise to a private right of action. *Katel Ltd. Liability Co. v. AT&T Corp.*, 607 F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2010). The ITRs "have treaty status" and were promulgated by a United Nations agency responsible for international communications issues in order to provide for the settlement of disputes by member states of the agency. The United States is one of the 191 member states of the agency. *Id.* at 67. While the ITRs do not protect private rights, the Second Circuit's decision is noteworthy in that it reiterated the rule that treaties do not create a private right of action absent express language to the contrary.

129. *Gandara*, 528 F.3d at 828 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907 cmt. a (1987), as quoted in *Cornejo v. San Diego*, 504 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2007)).

130. 717 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2010).

131. Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867, T.I.A.S. No. 10,824.

132. *Toor*, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 107 (citing *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008)).

133. *Id.*

2. *An End to the Carve-Out for Private Law*

Medellin has also led lower courts to apply the presumption against enforcement universally, apparently eliminating the carve-out for private law treaties that persisted through the postwar period up until *Medellin*. This can be seen in particular in several cases decided by the D.C. and Third Circuits between 2008 and 2010.

McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran is particularly instructive because it spans the period before and after *Medellin* and thus offers an unusual opportunity to witness the impact of the decision on lower courts' decision making.¹³⁴ A group of U.S. corporations, collectively called "McKesson," and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a federal agency that helps American businesses invest abroad, brought a complaint against Iran in the district court of Washington, D.C. They alleged that Iran had illegally expropriated McKesson's interest in an Iranian dairy company following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and that this nationalization violated McKesson's rights under the U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity,¹³⁵ which provided that "[p]roperty of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party" shall "receive the most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party" and that such property shall not be "taken without the prompt payment of just compensation."¹³⁶

In 2001, the D.C. Circuit held that the Treaty of Amity created a private right of action for American corporations in U.S. courts. It concluded that "[t]he Treaty of Amity . . . explicitly creates property rights for foreign nationals" of both countries, and therefore it "contemplates judicial enforcement of those rights" in both American and Iranian courts."¹³⁷ Having found private rights, it inferred a private right of action to enforce those rights, thereby reflecting the common approach to bilateral treaties—particularly Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties—prior to *Medellin*.¹³⁸

On a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, however, the newly elected Bush Administration argued that the entire action should be dismissed, because the Treaty of Amity did not confer a private right of action on McKesson Corporation.¹³⁹ The Supreme Court rejected the petition for

134. 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

135. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran art. IV, cl. 2, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, 903, 284 U.N.T.S. 93.

136. *Id.* art. IV.

137. *McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 271 F.3d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

138. Recall that even as courts in the post-World War II period were increasingly reluctant to find private rights of action in treaties, see *supra* Section I.B, they had continued to presume that private rights created in bilateral treaties, particularly in "Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" treaties, were enforceable. See, e.g., *Clark v. Allen*, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947) (holding that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany was enforceable in U.S. court). The Court may also have been persuaded by the fact that the United States "actively supported McKesson's right to assert its expropriation claim against Iran" in the U.S. court system. Brief for Appellees at 26, *McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-7113).

139. *McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 539 F.3d 485, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

certiorari, but the D.C. Circuit directed the district court to reconsider the case in light of the government's position.¹⁴⁰ The district court rejected the argument, Iran appealed, and the suit landed before the D.C. Circuit again in 2008. The sole question at issue was whether the Treaty of Amity created a private right of action that would allow enforcement of the treaty by a private party in U.S. courts.

While the case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in *Medellin*. The D.C. Circuit subsequently abandoned its 2001 position and, drawing heavily from *Medellin*, reversed its earlier position. It concluded that the Treaty of Amity did *not* create a private right of action for any party as a matter of U.S. law.¹⁴¹ Although the panel acknowledged that the "Treaty of Amity, like other treaties of its kind, is self-executing,"¹⁴² it held that according to the dicta in *Medellin*'s footnote three, "the background presumption is that [i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts."¹⁴³ The D.C. Circuit "[found] nothing in the Treaty of Amity that overcomes this presumption." While the Treaty of Amity did "benefit[] McKesson," in establishing that monetary compensation should be provided to parties like McKesson if its property was taken,¹⁴⁴ the treaty did not specify *how* compensation should be provided.¹⁴⁵ In other words, the treaty created a right but not a remedy, and its "silence on this [latter] point makes all the difference."¹⁴⁶

The D.C. Circuit's reluctance to infer a private right of action in the Treaty of Amity with Iran, despite its 2001 decision to the contrary, suggests that *Medellin* is, indeed, changing judicial practice. The *McKesson* Court explained that its decision was consistent with "traditional assumptions about how treaties operate."¹⁴⁷ That claim, however, was misleading: the *McKesson* decision was *not* consistent with "traditional assumptions" about such treaties nor even with earlier assumptions about the *particular* treaty in the case. Given that the United States is currently a party to Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties with dozens of states,¹⁴⁸ an extension of the *McKesson* line

(recounting the procedural history of the case).

140. *McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 320 F.3d 280, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (instructing the district court "to reexamine [the private right of action] issue in light of the representation of the United States that it does not interpret the Treaty of Amity to create such a cause of action").

141. *McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

142. *Id.* at 489.

143. *Id.* (quoting *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3).

144. *Id.*

145. *Id.*

146. *Id.* Although the court cited *Medellin* for the presumption against treaties creating private rights of action, the case most relevant to its decision was *Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.*, 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1988) (holding that a treaty that "only set[s] forth substantive rules of conduct and state[s] that compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs . . . do[es] not create private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in United States courts" (citations omitted)).

147. *McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 539 F.3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

148. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011 (2011), *available*

of reasoning to those long-standing bilateral treaties is likely to make a material difference to the status of international law in U.S. courts.¹⁴⁹

Medellin's presumption against private rights of action has spread to agreements that expressly create private rights. In *Gross v. German Foundation Industrial Initiative*,¹⁵⁰ the Third Circuit declined to find a private right of action in an executive agreement exclusively concerned with private law rights. Under the agreement between the United States and Germany, the United States agreed to shield German firms from Nazi-era litigation in U.S. courts and to quash sixty pending Holocaust cases. In exchange, the German Industrial Initiative would make available five billion deutsche marks for victims of corporate wrongdoing during the Nazi reign. Under the agreement, the majority of pending Holocaust-related cases were dismissed. Nevertheless, the Initiative had trouble raising funds and took eighteen months to meet its obligation of paying out the promised money to Holocaust victims. In 2007, the victim-beneficiaries therefore brought suit in federal court, seeking interest payments from the Initiative in the form of damages for breach of contract. The Third Circuit dismissed the suit, holding that the Joint Statement evinced a "strong intent" on the part of the signatories not to create private rights of action.¹⁵¹ This proposition, the Third Circuit held, found support in *Medellin's* footnote three, and its "background presumption . . . that [i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts."¹⁵²

The Third Circuit's extension of the *Medellin* presumption to the Joint Statement in *Gross* is notable because it runs directly against the long tradition in U.S. courts of presuming that treaties that concern private, common-law type rights—such as property, inheritance, and contract rights—also create private causes of action. As discussed in Section II.A, the Supreme Court routinely assumed that treaties of such a nature were enforceable in U.S. courts from the Founding through World War II.¹⁵³ In the years leading up to *Medellin*, lower federal courts maintained that posture.¹⁵⁴ For instance, courts continued to infer that treaties like the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which

at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf> (listing all of the FCN treaties currently in force between the United States and other countries, by country).

149. The United States is also a party to Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with 40 countries. See *Bilateral Investment Treaties*, TRADE COMPLIANCE CENTER, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). Nonetheless, because BITs typically provide for the arbitration of disputes before bodies such as the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), *Medellin* will have less bearing on the enforcement of BITs. Even *Medellin* itself noted that its holding was unlikely to affect BITs, given that the United States had passed implementing legislation which gives decisions by the ICSID tribunal the status of "final judgments." *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008). Interestingly, *McKesson* is still being litigated in the D.C. Circuit, but now under Iranian law. Under Iran's legal regime, "treaties have the force of law." Accordingly, all parties conceded in 2009 that *McKesson Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 752 F. Supp. 2d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2010).

150. 549 F.3d 605 (3d Cir. 2008).

151. *Id.* at 612.

152. *Id.* at 615 (quoting *Medellin*, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3) (internal quotation marks omitted).

153. See *supra* Section I.A.

154. See *supra* note 85 and accompanying text.

governs contracts for the sale of goods between private entities in different countries, generated private rights of action.¹⁵⁵ If *Gross* signifies a new way forward and an extension of *Medellin*'s presumption to treaties concerning private entities and their common law rights, it could raise questions about the enforceability of numerous treaties to which the United States is a party.¹⁵⁶

Medellin has already led to changes in courts' approaches to direct enforcement of international law in at least four circuits. The recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit are the most significant, because they demonstrate an extension of *Medellin*'s presumption against private rights of action for treaties that were previously understood to be self-executing. If this trend continues—and is not addressed by the Supreme Court—it will likely be substantially more difficult for private parties to directly enforce Article II treaty obligations in U.S. courts through a private right of action.

III. HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW COMES HOME

Many will read our findings on the trend in the case law after *Medellin* as sounding a death knell for the enforcement of Article II treaties in U.S. courts. After all, it is commonly assumed that if an international treaty cannot be used as a source of a private right of action, then it cannot be enforced in a U.S. court at all. That common assumption, however, misses a significant part of the picture of international law enforcement in U.S. courts. In fact, treaties are regularly enforced in U.S. courts even when there is no private right of action. Understanding this bigger picture is essential to understanding the true impact of the courts' shifting position on the enforcement of treaties through private rights of action.

International treaties are enforced by courts in three circumstances in which the treaty itself does not give rise to a private right of action. First, treaties may create a right that can then be enforced through legislation that makes the right actionable. We call this "indirect enforcement." Second, a treaty may be invoked defensively by a private party who has been prosecuted or sued under a statute that is inconsistent with a treaty provision. We call this "defensive enforcement." Third, courts may look to treaties when interpreting statutes and, more controversially, constitutional provisions. We call this "interpretive enforcement." We refrain from engaging in evaluative comparisons among these methods because the enforcement of treaties through indirect, defensive, or interpretive means is not an interchangeable choice. Rather, whether a given method of treaty enforcement will be available to a litigant or to a judge will depend on the particular treaty at issue and the context

155. *E.g.*, *BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petoleos de Ecuador*, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Convention on the International Sale of Goods gives rise to private rights of action).

156. *Cf.* ABA/ASIL Report, *supra* note 122, at 8 (noting that "there have been quite a few other provisions in treaties affecting private commercial law that [historically have been] enforced without the need for implementing legislation," such as the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, 527 U.N.T.S. 198; the Protocol on Powers of Attorney Which Are To Be Utilized Abroad, Feb. 17, 1940, 56 Stat. 1376, 161 U.N.T.S. 229; and the Protocol on Juridical Personality of Foreign Companies, June 25, 1936, 55 Stat. 1201, 161 U.N.T.S. 217).

in which an individual's claim has arisen. We therefore examine each of these methods below in depth, in order to provide a comprehensive, unified discussion of U.S. treaty enforcement that has until now been missing.

A. Indirect Enforcement

Even when a treaty does not provide a private right of action, private rights of litigants in the treaty can often be enforced indirectly through various statutory vehicles. The most common and obvious of these statutory vehicles is implementing legislation enacted precisely to give force and effect to a particular treaty obligation. Less well known is the enforcement of treaties through section 1983 and habeas corpus proceedings.¹⁵⁷ We discuss each of these in brief.

1. Implementing Legislation

Congress has the authority to implement treaties through legislation.¹⁵⁸ In so doing, it may also choose to create private rights of action that allow individual plaintiffs to sue to enforce international legal obligations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has asserted that “a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.”¹⁵⁹

Several treaties are currently enforced through implementing legislation that includes private rights of action. Consider, for example, the U.N. Convention Against Torture,¹⁶⁰ which is enforced in part through the Torture Victim Protection Act's establishment of civil liability for individuals who commit torture,¹⁶¹ the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction,¹⁶² which was implemented through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act providing for a cause of action for individuals seeking to assert their parental rights in court;¹⁶³ and the Chemical Weapons Convention

157. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), might be thought to be another mechanism for indirect enforcement of a treaty. However, treaty obligations—both self-executing and non-self-executing—are relevant in ATCA litigation only to the extent that they provide evidence of a customary international law norm. See *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 718, 734-36, (2004). In such cases it is the customary norm, not the treaty obligation per se, that the courts enforce.

158. Indeed, there continues to be a debate as to whether Congress has a *duty* to implement treaties that have passed through advice and consent proceedings or whether Congress may pursue its own independent evaluation before approving appropriations and other implementing measures. See LOUIS HENKIN, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION* 204-06 (2d ed. 1996). The Supreme Court has held that Congress may act beyond the scope of its enumerated powers in Article I when passing legislation that is “necessary and proper” to enforce a treaty. See *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416, 432-35 (1920).

159. *Sosa*, 542 U.S. at 727.

160. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.

161. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (“An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual . . .”).

162. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.

163. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006).

Implementation Act of 1998,¹⁶⁴ which, as its title makes clear, implements the U.S. obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. These are only a few examples of the many treaties that are enforced in U.S. courts pursuant to implementing legislation passed for this express purpose.

2. Section 1983

In recent years, plaintiffs have sought to recover damages under section 1983¹⁶⁵ for violations of their right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.¹⁶⁶ Rather than require that the treaty be self-executing and expressly give rise to a private right of action—as courts have increasingly required for direct enforcement of treaties since *Medellin*—courts considering indirect enforcement through section 1983 have required that the treaty be *self-executing* and confer *private rights*. When a treaty satisfies these two requirements, the private right supplied by the treaty has been treated as presumptively enforceable under section 1983. In other words, section 1983 serves as a statutory mechanism that supplies the relevant cause of action.

To date, several circuit courts have considered whether a foreign national who is not informed of his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention may bring a private right of action for damages under section 1983. The Seventh Circuit is the only court to hold that a treaty, in this case the Convention, meets both requirements in the absence of implementing legislation. In *Jogi v. Voges*,¹⁶⁷ the Seventh Circuit decided that an individual may sue for damages under section 1983 when he or she is not informed of his right to consular notification. The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by concluding that the phrase “and laws” in section 1983 should be read to include treaties.¹⁶⁸ It noted that “[o]nly a small subset of treaties . . . would even be candidates for such a lawsuit.”¹⁶⁹ An individual seeking to proceed under section 1983 for a violation of his rights under a treaty must show two things: (1) that a personal right can be inferred from the treaty, in this case from Article

164. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).

165. In relevant part, section 1983 provides that [e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).

166. Subsection I.A.2 focuses exclusively on circuit court decisions that have considered that question.

167. 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007).

168. *Id.* at 826-27. The Seventh Circuit decided to withdraw its earlier opinion in this case, *Jogi v. Voges*, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005), and substitute it with the one described here. The court noted that since the first opinion was decided, the Supreme Court had spoken on the subject of the Vienna Convention in *Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon*, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), and had addressed the relationship between the exclusionary rule and section 1983. Based on these developments, the court decided to re-issue the opinion on narrower grounds. See *Jogi*, 480 F.3d at 824.

169. 480 F.3d at 827.

36 of the Convention, and (2) that he is entitled to a private remedy.¹⁷⁰ The court concluded that although most parts of the Convention address only state-to-state relations, language in the treaty providing that authorities “shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph”¹⁷¹ unambiguously refers to the existence of individual rights. Noting that the Supreme Court had held that “[o]nce a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that Jogi was entitled to pursue his claim under section 1983.¹⁷²

At the moment, the Seventh Circuit stands alone. The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have each concluded that a foreign national may not bring an action for damages under section 1983 based on a state’s alleged breach of the Vienna Convention,¹⁷³ and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that the Convention does not create judicially enforceable rights at all.¹⁷⁴ The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits in *Gandara* and *Cornejo*, respectively, agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the Convention is a self-executing treaty, in that it “has the force of domestic law without the need for implementing legislation by Congress.”¹⁷⁵ However, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that for “any treaty to be susceptible to judicial enforcement it must both confer individual rights and be self-executing.”¹⁷⁶ Article 36, in its view, does not confer private rights. In *Mora*,¹⁷⁷ the Second Circuit—drawing on *Medellin* and representations by the Executive Branch—similarly concluded that the rights outlined in the Convention belonged to state parties and not private individuals.¹⁷⁸

Even though the Seventh Circuit stands alone in holding that actions for damages under the Vienna Convention specifically can be brought through the section 1983 vehicle, the reasoning of the other circuits in the Vienna Convention cases shows that for treaties aside from the Vienna Convention, section 1983 could prove a more fruitful instrument for enforcing treaty obligations. The Ninth and Second Circuits, in *Cornejo* and *Mora* respectively, both agreed with the Seventh Circuit that whether a treaty confers a private right is a distinct question from whether it entitles an individual to a specific remedy—for example, a private right of action. As long as a treaty meets the first test, it need not meet the second in order for a private party to raise a

170. *Id.*

171. *Id.* at 833 (citing Article 36 of the Vienna Convention).

172. *Id.* at 835 (citing *Gonzaga University v. Doe*, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002)).

173. *E.g.*, *Gandara v. Bennett*, 528 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2008); *Mora v. New York*, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008); *Cornejo v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 504 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2007).

174. The Fifth and Sixth Circuit precedents on the matter involved criminal proceedings. *United States v. Emuegbunam*, 268 F.3d 377, 391-92 (6th Cir. 2001); *United States v. Jimenez-Nava*, 243 F.3d 192, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2001).

175. *Gandara*, 528 F.3d at 828; *Cornejo*, 504 F.3d at 856 (“There is no question that the Vienna Convention is self-executing. As such, it has the force of domestic law without the need for implementing legislation by Congress.”).

176. *Gandara*, 528 F.3d at 828 (quoting *Cornejo*, 504 F.3d at 856) (internal quotation marks omitted).

177. 524 F.3d at 193 n.16.

178. *Id.* at 188, 194.

treaty-based claim in a section 1983 lawsuit. In *Cornejo*, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Vienna Convention did not confer private rights at all, and so section 1983 could not provide a relevant cause of action.¹⁷⁹ In *Mora*, the Second Circuit held that if a plaintiff had been shown to enjoy an individual right under the Vienna Convention, his claim for “damages pursuant to § 1983 would likely be actionable.”¹⁸⁰

In sum, there appears to be widespread agreement among the circuits that where a treaty protects private rights, section 1983 provides a private right of action that can be sometimes be used to enforce those rights in court.

3. *Habeas Corpus*

The federal habeas statute provides that habeas relief is available for violations of a treaty. It provides that writs of habeas corpus may be granted to a prisoner who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”¹⁸¹ While the majority of modern day habeas petitioners alleging treaty violations have been unsuccessful, courts have demonstrated a willingness to consider the merits of claims regarding treaty violations in habeas petitions.¹⁸²

Since habeas corpus constitutes a separate statutory mechanism for treaty enforcement, the analysis is similar to that in the section 1983 context. Thus far, the courts that have addressed the issue have required that the treaty be self-executing in order to serve as a basis for habeas relief,¹⁸³ and they have

179. 504 F.3d at 858-59.

180. 524 F.3d at 199 n.23.

181. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). Most federal prisoners file habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after they have exhausted their direct appeals. If the remedy provided by section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention,” prisoners may petition for traditional writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. *Id.* § 2255(c). Section 2241, unlike section 2255, expressly includes violation of “treaties of the United States” as a basis for challenging custody. *Id.* § 2241(c)(3). However, “the grounds for relief under § 2255 are the equivalent of those under general federal habeas corpus statutes that refer to ‘the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” *Bannerman v. Snyder*, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting *Davis v. United States*, 417 U.S. 333, 344 (1974)). Thus, this Section assumes that treaty violations can be alleged under either § 2241 or § 2255.

182. The Supreme Court has limited the availability of relief for treaty violations through its application of state default rules. *See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon*, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (applying procedural bar rule to claims asserted by habeas petitioner even though doing so would prevent compliance with the decision of the ICJ); *Breard v. Greene*, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (*per curiam*) (applying Virginia’s procedural default doctrine to a Vienna Convention claim on habeas review). Moreover, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) limits a federal court’s review of a state court’s decision regarding a habeas petition. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections in 28 U.S.C.). For a writ to issue under the AEDPA, a federal court must find that the state court’s decision was either contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).

183. *See, e.g., Bannerman*, 325 F.3d at 724 (reasoning that “the reference to ‘treaties of the United States’ in § 2241 cannot be construed as an implementation of non-self-executing provisions of treaties so as to render them judicially enforceable under § 2241 when they are not enforceable under § 2255”); *Wang v. Ashcroft*, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Unless a treaty is self-executing . . . it does not, in and of itself, create individual rights that can give rise to habeas relief.”). Often, however, the court will find that implementing legislation makes it unnecessary to decide whether the treaty, on its own, could be enforced via habeas. *See, e.g., Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft*, 342 F.3d 207, 218 n.22 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We similarly find it unnecessary to consider the proposition that *habeas corpus* claims may be

rejected petitions in cases where the treaties relied upon by petitioners are non-self-executing.¹⁸⁴ If, however, the treaty is self-executing and confers private rights, the habeas corpus statutory provisions confer the relevant private right of action, even if the treaty itself does not.¹⁸⁵ Although most courts have not focused explicitly on private rights or private rights of action in the habeas context, there is support for the proposition that a habeas petition obviates the need for an independent treaty-specific private right of action.¹⁸⁶

Courts have, for example, allowed petitioners to allege violations of extradition treaties in habeas petitions. In the case discussed earlier, *United States v. Rauscher*,¹⁸⁷ the Supreme Court established the principle, now known as the rule of specialty, that an extradited defendant has an individually enforceable right not to be prosecuted for any offense other than that for which the surrendering country agreed to extradite.¹⁸⁸ Thus, an individual may seek relief under an extradition treaty in one of two ways. First, a defendant may invoke the extradition treaty defensively in criminal proceedings against him, as did the defendant in *Rauscher*.¹⁸⁹ Second, provided that all other remedies have been exhausted and that there are no procedural bars, a prisoner may file a habeas petition alleging that his detention or sentence violates the terms of the relevant extradition treaty. This is not a mere theoretical possibility. Petitioners have indeed used the habeas petition to argue that their convictions violated extradition treaties in cases involving the rule of specialty announced in *Rauscher*,¹⁹⁰ forcible kidnapping,¹⁹¹ and the imposition of a life sentence.¹⁹²

Although most such claims have been unsuccessful, courts have accepted that petitioners may use a habeas petition to enforce their rights under an extradition treaty. In *Benitez v. Garcia*, for instance, a Ninth Circuit panel held that a sentence violated the terms of an extradition treaty and granted the petitioner's habeas request.¹⁹³ Benitez, a Mexican citizen who had fled to Venezuela, was extradited to the United States pursuant to an extradition treaty with Venezuela and sentenced to fifteen years to life for murder by a California trial court. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his sentence violated an extradition decree from the Supreme Court of Venezuela when it

based on violations of treaties regardless whether the treaty is non-self-executing or self-executing.”).

184. See, e.g., *Wesson v. U.S. Penitentiary Beaumont*, 305 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a claim brought pursuant to the ICCPR); *Garza v. Lappin*, 253 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a claim brought pursuant to the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).

185. Stephen Vladeck has argued that “after *St. Cyr*, courts are on far shakier ground in barring the use of habeas to litigate claims under non-self-executing treaties.” Stephen I. Vladeck, *Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension Clause After St. Cyr*, 113 YALE L. J. 2007, 2008 (2004).

186. See, e.g., *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing *Wang*, 320 F.3d at 140-41 & n.16) (“The availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to rely on a private right of action . . .”).

187. 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886) (“[C]ourts are bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of [the extradition] treaty . . .”). See *supra* text accompanying notes 62-66.

188. *Id.*

189. See Section II.B, *infra*, for a discussion of the defensive use of treaties.

190. E.g., *Gallo-Chamorro v. United States*, 233 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).

191. E.g., *Kasi v. Angelone*, 300 F.3d 487, 492 (4th Cir. 2002).

192. E.g., *Benitez v. Garcia*, 495 F.3d 640, 641 (9th Cir. 2007).

193. *Benitez v. Garcia*, 449 F.3d 971, 972 (9th Cir. 2006), *superseded by* 495 F.3d at 640.

had approved the extradition. That decree stated that Benitez could not receive the death penalty or be sentenced to more than thirty years if convicted.¹⁹⁴ In 2006, the Ninth Circuit granted Benitez's habeas petition, finding that the extradition treaty was clearly established federal law and that it limited the punishment that Benitez could receive to that specified as part of his extradition under the treaty.¹⁹⁵ A year later, however, the court withdrew the opinion and substituted it with one denying the petition.¹⁹⁶ In this subsequent opinion, it reasoned that because the decree of the Venezuelan Supreme Court was unilaterally imposed and not negotiated, Benitez's sentence did not violate the extradition treaty.¹⁹⁷

Beyond extradition treaties, federal courts have allowed plaintiffs to use habeas corpus to bring suits based on violations of other treaties. For instance, the Seventh Circuit vacated a district court's dismissal of a habeas petition alleging a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in *Osagiede v. United States*.¹⁹⁸ Osagiede, a Nigerian alien, was arrested for heroin distribution and was not informed of his right to contact his consulate under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. At trial, he was convicted. Subsequently, Osagiede filed a pro se habeas motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a remedy at trial for the Article 36 violation. The Seventh Circuit held that Osagiede was entitled "to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he [was] prejudiced by the failure to invoke the Convention."¹⁹⁹ In support of its holding, the court stated that, contrary to the government's claim, "a reasonable Illinois lawyer would have known that this Court has never held that Article 36 did not create individual rights; instead, we have always assumed that it did."²⁰⁰ Because a reasonable lawyer would have argued that the Vienna Convention was self-executing and that it conferred private rights on individuals, the Court held that the petitioner should be able to use habeas to make a Vienna Convention-based claim.²⁰¹

Plaintiffs have also sought to use habeas petitions to allege that their rights under the Geneva Conventions were violated when they were held as enemy combatants.²⁰² It remains unsettled whether this sort of action is possible. In *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's

194. *Id.* at 973.

195. *Id.* at 977-78. The case was governed by the standards set forth under the AEDPA. *Id.* at 974. For a discussion of the AEDPA, see *supra* note 182.

196. The court offered no explanation for the substitution in its per curiam opinion. *Benitez*, 495 F.3d at 641.

197. *Id.* at 644.

198. 543 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2008). Unlike *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), *Osagiede* did not involve the application of state procedural default rules or an attempt to enforce a judgment of the ICJ.

199. *Osagiede*, 543 F.3d at 412-13.

200. *Id.* at 409-10.

201. The court noted its earlier decision in *Jogi v. Voges*, 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007). For a discussion of *Jogi*, see *supra* Subsection II.A.2. In *Jogi*, the Seventh Circuit held that section 1983 provided the relevant private right of action. 480 F.3d at 836. In *Osagiede*, the court appears to have assumed that the habeas petition served the same function. 543 F.3d at 410.

202. See, e.g., *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

attempt to bring a Geneva Conventions claim via habeas petition, concluding that the treaty was not self-executing.²⁰³ In *Hamdan*, the D.C. Circuit similarly declined to directly enforce the Geneva Conventions.²⁰⁴ The Supreme Court reversed, ruling in favor of the plaintiff on the merits and finding that the President had violated Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.²⁰⁵ It found it unnecessary, however, to decide whether the Geneva Conventions were self-executing in order to reach that holding.²⁰⁶

Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions through habeas appeared to have been obviated for some time by section 5 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),²⁰⁷ which provided that “[n]o person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding . . . as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories.”²⁰⁸ The constitutionality of this provision remains a topic of ongoing dispute.²⁰⁹ However, the Military Commissions Act of 2009²¹⁰ amended this provision to state that “[n]o alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a basis for a *private right of action*.”²¹¹ Under the amended law, enforcement of the Conventions through habeas remains a possibility, because the habeas corpus statutory provisions can provide the relevant private right of action.

B. Defensive Enforcement

Up until this point, we have been discussing offensive enforcement of treaties by private individuals. As we have shown, section 1983 and the habeas

203. *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2003), *vacated*, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). The Supreme Court did not reach this issue on appeal.

204. *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), *rev'd*, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).

205. *Hamdan*, 548 U.S. at 630.

206. *Id.* at 627-28. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, *The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide*, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 73, 73-76 (2007) (discussing the efforts of the President to respond to the Supreme Court's decision in *Hamdan* by proposing statutory language that ultimately led to the passage of several provisions in the Military Commissions Act purporting to curtail judicial enforcement of the Geneva Conventions). Section 948b(g) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections at 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) provides that “no alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.”

207. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 (2006).

208. *Id.*; see also *Noriega v. Pastrana*, 564 F.3d 1290, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We find it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing, because it is within Congress’ power to change domestic law, even if the law originally arose from a self-executing treaty.” (internal citation omitted)). Vázquez disagrees with this interpretation in part because the MCA does not purport to bar the domestic effect of the Geneva Conventions in all forums. Vázquez, *supra* note 206, at 88.

209. See *Noriega*, 564 F.3d 1290, *cert. denied*, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brief for International Law Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, *Kiyemba v. Obama*, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234); see also Vázquez, *supra* note 206, at 87 (arguing that section 948b(g) of the MCA would be unconstitutional if “it prohibited a criminal defendant from raising a valid defense [under the Geneva Conventions] or the tribunal from taking cognizance of it”).

210. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).

211. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(e) (West 2009) (emphasis added).

statutes may supply the relevant right of action for claims brought under treaties that confer private rights. Now, we turn to the defensive enforcement of treaties. A treaty may be invoked defensively by a private party if a private individual is prosecuted or sued under a statute that is inconsistent with a treaty provision. The defensive enforcement of treaties can be found in two types of cases. In the first, a private party seeks to use the treaty to defend against a claim by the United States government. In the second, a private party seeks to use the treaty to defend against a claim by another private party under state or federal law.

Defensive enforcement is generally permitted even for treaties that do not provide private rights of action or even confer private rights. That is because a cause of action exists independent of the treaty.²¹² While few courts have expressly addressed the difference between defensive and offensive uses of treaties,²¹³ case law is consistent with this understanding that a treaty may be enforced defensively even when there is no private right of action.²¹⁴

The Supreme Court first considered an individual's attempt to invoke a treaty to bar a prosecution in *United States v. Rauscher*.²¹⁵ There, the Court concluded that the provisions of an extradition treaty, permitting prosecution for certain enumerated crimes on which the extradition request was based, could serve as a defense to the government's attempt to prosecute the defendant for a crime not specified in the extradition treaty.²¹⁶

Several decades later, during the Prohibition era, the Court held that a treaty that limits the jurisdiction of the United States could be invoked in a defensive posture by an individual to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction in a federal prosecution. In *Cook v. United States*,²¹⁷ the government seized a British vessel that was discovered carrying undocumented liquor eleven-and-one-half miles from the U.S. coast. The seizure was made pursuant to section

212. Other commentators have noted that a treaty may be enforced defensively by a private party even if the treaty does not contain a private right of action. See, e.g., Thomas Michael McDonnell, *Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts—Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents*, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1451 (1996) (“[A] defendant being prosecuted or sued under a state or prior federal law that is inconsistent with a treaty is entitled to invoke the treaty in court to nullify the state or federal law without having to show that the treaty confers a private right of action.”); Carlos M. Vázquez, *Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals*, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1144 (1992) (“A right of action is not necessary to invoke a treaty as a defense.”).

213. The Southern District of New York briefly explored the distinction in *Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pan Am. Airways*, 58 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).

214. Whether it must be self-executing or not is a matter of some dispute. Some commentators have suggested that a treaty may be enforced defensively by a private party even if it is not self-executing, though it is not yet a matter of consensus. David Sloss argues that the non-self-execution declarations of the Race Convention, the ICCPR, and the Torture Convention were adopted to clarify that the treaty makers intended for the human rights treaties not to create a private right of action in U.S. courts for certain treaty rights, rather than to bar judicial remedies altogether. David Sloss, *Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations*, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1111-23 (2000).

215. 119 U.S. 407, 430-31 (1886).

216. *Id.* at 423-24. The *Rauscher* Court discussed domestic legislation bolstering its conclusion that an extradited party could not be tried for any offense other than that charged in the extradition proceedings. However, the Court did not seem to view the statutes as necessary to reach its decision. *Id.*

217. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).

581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which permitted officers of the Coast Guard “to stop and board any vessel at any place” within twelve miles of the U.S. coast to examine the manifest and to inspect and search the merchandise.²¹⁸ Subsequently, the shipmaster, Cook, was fined for the failure to include the liquor in the manifest. Although the seizure was lawful under the terms of the Tariff Act, it occurred beyond the territorial limits permitted under a 1924 treaty between the United States and Britain.²¹⁹ Cook raised the treaty to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction, arguing that it had modified the Tariff Act of 1922.

The Court had previously held that a court’s power to try a defendant is not ordinarily affected by the manner in which the defendant is brought to trial.²²⁰ However, the Court distinguished this doctrine, known as the *Ker-Frisbie* rule, stating that “[t]he objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made,” but that, “[o]ur government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws.”²²¹ This conclusion had been suggested by the Court in *Ford v. United States*, a case decided a few years prior to *Cook* concerning the same treaty.²²² Although the convictions of the defendants in *Ford* were affirmed because they had not raised the jurisdictional defense in a timely manner, the Court stated that a seizure in violation of a treaty presented questions distinct from the *Ker-Frisbie* doctrine. As in *Rauscher*, the treaty in *Cook* and *Ford* did not concern the rights of individuals, but rather the obligations of the state parties.²²³

Both *Rauscher* and *Cook* were decided in the pre-World War II era, but the doctrines established in these cases continue to be treated as precedent.²²⁴ Thus, these cases may be read to support the proposition that a treaty may be enforced defensively by an individual who is prosecuted by the government, even if the treaty does not give rise to private rights or create a private right of action.²²⁵

218. *Id.* at 107.

219. See Convention between the United States and Great Britain for prevention of smuggling of intoxicating liquors, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761.

220. See *Frisbie v. Collins*, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The Court applied the *Ker-Frisbie* doctrine in *United States v. Alvarez-Machain*, 504 U.S. 655, 661-62 (1992).

221. *Cook*, 288 U.S. at 121.

222. 273 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1927).

223. Article I provided that “[t]he High Contracting Parties declare that it is their firm intention to uphold the principle that 3 marine miles extending from the coast line outwards and measured from low-water mark constitute proper limits of territorial waters.” *Cook*, 288 U.S. at 110.

224. See *supra*, Subsection II.A.3, for a discussion of *Rauscher* and the doctrine of specialty.

225. Several other Supreme Court cases have considered defensive uses of treaties. In *Kolovrat v. Oregon*, a case decided after World War II, the Court held that an FCN treaty that provided reciprocal rights of inheritance to citizens of the United States and Yugoslavia could serve as a defense to a state’s action for escheatment to obtain the land of an intestate decedent whose only next of kin lived in Yugoslavia. The Court neither discussed nor considered whether the treaty in *Kolovrat* created private rights. 366 U.S. 187 (1961). In some cases, the Court has rejected a treaty defense on its merits. See, e.g., *Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano*, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); *Patson v. Pennsylvania*, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). Notably, the majority in *Medellin* cited *Kolovrat* and *Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.* as examples of Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce treaties that the Court has found to be self-

Neither case addressed the question of whether a non-self-executing treaty may be invoked by an individual in a defensive posture. Both treaties at issue in the cases were found to be self-executing and therefore the issue was not presented. The *Cook* Court stated that the treaty between the United States and Britain was self-executing and therefore superseded the terms of an inconsistent federal statute.²²⁶ While the *Rauscher* Court did not use the term “self-executing,” it did engage in an analysis of whether the extradition treaty under consideration was directly enforceable in U.S. courts.²²⁷

The Fifth Circuit has also recognized defensive enforcement of a treaty, but has apparently limited this mode of enforcement to self-executing treaties—at least where the treaties limit the jurisdiction of domestic courts. In *United States v. Postal*, decided in 1979, two people were arrested aboard a foreign vessel that was seized beyond the twelve-mile limit in violation of the Convention on the High Seas.²²⁸ Authorities discovered marijuana on board and the two individuals were convicted of conspiring to import the drug into the United States.²²⁹ The defendants raised the violation of the Convention as a jurisdictional defense to their prosecution. The Court read *Ford* and *Cook* “to stand for the proposition that self-executing treaties may act to deprive the United States, and hence its courts, of jurisdiction over property and individuals that would otherwise be subject to that jurisdiction.”²³⁰ It explained, however, that “treaties affect the municipal law of the United States only when those treaties are given effect by congressional legislation or are, by their nature, self-executing.”²³¹ Because the Court found that the Convention on the High Seas was not self-executing, it held that the defendants could not rely upon it “as a defense to the court’s jurisdiction.”²³² The Fifth Circuit’s discussion regarding self-execution was limited to treaties that limit the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The reasoning, however, could be applied more broadly to the defensive enforcement of treaties as a whole.

The Supreme Court has also recognized a treaty-based defense in a private lawsuit. In *El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng*, the Supreme Court considered whether an airline could enforce a treaty defensively when sued by a private individual under state law. The plaintiff, a passenger, had been subjected to an intrusive security search before boarding an El Al Israel Airlines flight from New York to Tel Aviv and subsequently sued El Al Israel Airlines for damages, asserting a state-law personal injury claim.²³³ The Court held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention precluded a passenger from

executing based on the language of the treaties. *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2008). *Patsone*, which involved a treaty granting reciprocal rights to citizens of Italy and the United States, would fall into the same category. 232 U.S. at 145-46.

226. *Cook v. United States*, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).

227. *United States v. Rauscher*, 119 U.S. 407, 410-11, 429-30 (1886).

228. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).

229. *Id.* at 865.

230. *Id.* at 875.

231. *Id.*

232. *Id.* at 884.

233. 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999).

maintaining an action for damages under state law when the passenger's claim did not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention.²³⁴ Although previously the Court had held that the Convention gives rise to a private right of action for individual passengers,²³⁵ its decision to permit the Warsaw Convention to limit the conditions of liability under state law did not turn on an interpretation of the individual rights of airlines under the treaty. Rather, the opinion focused on the drafting history and purpose of the Warsaw Convention.²³⁶ It permitted the Convention to serve as a defense in the same manner as a federal law.

Similarly, in the context of private lawsuits, the Second Circuit's recent decision in *Brzak v. United Nations*²³⁷ is in accordance with *Postal* and *El Al Israel Airlines*. In *Brzak*, two United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) employees sued the United Nations and three former United Nations officials, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal law, as well as various state common law torts. The defendants raised the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN) as a defense, a treaty that the United States has ratified that extends immunity from suit to the United Nations and diplomatic envoys. The Court stated that determining whether the CPIUN applied to bar the suit turned on whether it was self-executing.²³⁸ Relying primarily on the negotiation and ratification history, the court concluded that the CPIUN was self-executing and thus enforceable in court. In reaching the conclusion that the treaty could be applied defensively, the court did not find it necessary to determine whether the treaty conferred private rights—suggesting, once again, that it is not necessary for a treaty to confer private rights in order to be used defensively in court.

C. Interpretive Enforcement

Courts often look to treaties when interpreting statutes and, more controversially, constitutional provisions. In *Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy*, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court: “[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains”²³⁹ This principle, now known as the *Charming Betsy* canon, animates the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which states: “Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of

234. *Id.* at 176.

235. *See, e.g.*, *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.*, 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).

236. The Court reasoned that “[r]ecourse to local law . . . would undermine the uniform regulation of international air carrier liability that the Warsaw Convention was designed to foster.” 525 U.S. at 161.

237. 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010).

238. *Id.* at 111.

239. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). This concept was first described three years earlier. *Talbot v. Seeman*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) (“[T]he laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and usages of nations, or the general doctrines of national law.”).

the United States.”²⁴⁰ We call this principle interpretive enforcement.

Like other interpretive canons, interpretive enforcement is a device for resolving ambiguity.²⁴¹ It uses the international legal commitments of the United States to fill interpretive gaps and resolve uncertainty that would otherwise exist in statutory provisions. The canon does not encourage courts to turn a blind eye to the evidence—far from it. If there is clear evidence—such as statutory text or legislative history—that the statute was intended to permit a violation of international law, then the canon is inapplicable.²⁴²

Using interpretive enforcement, courts may enforce international law by interpreting a statute so as not to conflict with an earlier treaty or other international agreement—whether self-executing or not.²⁴³ In *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.*, for example, the Court refused to interpret the Par Value Modification Act in a way that would render an Article II treaty unenforceable in the United States. It explained, “[t]here is, first, a firm and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action.”²⁴⁴ The Court concluded that “[l]egislative silence is not sufficient to abrogate a treaty.”²⁴⁵

Similarly, in *McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras*, the Supreme Court engaged in interpretive enforcement when it found that the U.S. National Labor Relations Board did not have jurisdiction over labor disputes on vessels flying a foreign flag. In arriving at that conclusion, the Court expressly quoted the *Charming Betsy* admonition against construing an act of Congress to violate the law of nations “if any other possible construction remains.”²⁴⁶ It concluded that “for us to sanction the exercise of local sovereignty . . . in this ‘delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.’”²⁴⁷ Since it was unable “to find any such clear expression,” it held

240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114 (1987); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, *The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision*, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 764 n.75 (2005) (“[R]eferences to this canon of statutory construction often equate Marshall’s reference to the law of nations with international law.”).

241. There is a wide range of similar substantive interpretive canons in U.S. law. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, *CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY* 884 (4th ed. 2007). An excellent discussion of the *Charming Betsy* canon appears in Rebecca Crootof, Note, *Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon*, 120 YALE L.J. 1784 (2010).

242. If the statute cannot fairly be construed in such a way, it renders the conflicting sections of the treaty unenforceable under domestic law. See, e.g., *Breard v. Greene*, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1997); *Reid v. Covert*, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1956); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) (1987).

243. See *Weinberger v. Rossi*, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); *McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras*, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); *Cook v. United States*, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); *United States v. Yunis*, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); *United States v. Georgescu*, 723 F. Supp. 912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); *United States v. Palestine Liberation Org.*, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

244. 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (quoting *Cook v. United States*, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)).

245. *Id.* (citing *Weinberger*, 456 U.S. at 32).

246. 372 U.S. at 21 (quoting *Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy*, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).

247. *Id.* at 21-22 (quoting *Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.*, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957))

that jurisdiction did not extend to the ship, consistent with the Treaty of Friendship.²⁴⁸

Interpretive enforcement occurs, as well, in cases that do not expressly reference the *Charming Betsy* canon. For example, in *Cook v. United States*, the Court held that the re-enactment of prior statutes that were in conflict with an intervening treaty did not reflect a congressional purpose to supersede the international agreement.²⁴⁹ The Court reasoned that “[a] treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.”²⁵⁰

Interpretive enforcement may extend to non-self-executing treaties as well as self-executing ones. As scholar and former State Department counselor Sarah Cleveland has put it, non-self-executing treaties “can be the basis for . . . the construing of a statute to comport with the United States’s international obligations.”²⁵¹ This view is echoed in a recent decision in the case *Khan v. Holder*.²⁵² In that case, Anjam Parvez Khan’s application for asylum in the United States was denied by an immigration judge because he had engaged in terrorist activity, which is grounds for dismissal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Among other things, Khan argued that the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees “compel[led] a narrower definition of ‘terrorist activity’” than that provided in the statute.²⁵³ After noting that the Protocol was not self-executing and thus did not carry the force of law,²⁵⁴ the Ninth Circuit stated that the Protocol still could influence the interpretation of a statute:

Under *Charming Betsy*, we should interpret the INA in such a way as to avoid any conflict with the Protocol, if possible. Khan’s argument that the terrorism bar violates the obligations of the United States in the Protocol fails because the Protocol does not conflict with the INA’s definition of “terrorist activity.”²⁵⁵

This reading is consistent with the interpretive enforcement paradigm—it avoids putting the United States in violation of its international legal commitments unless the political branches make clear their intention to do so.

More controversially, courts might engage in interpretive enforcement of

(citations omitted).

248. *Id.* at 22.

249. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).

250. *Id.* at 120; see *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.*, 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); see also *Clark v. Allen*, 331 U.S. 503, 510 (1947) (holding that the national policy, as expressed by the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, was not incompatible with the treaty-granted rights of inheritance given to German aliens and that treaty provisions were not necessarily invalidated by the outbreak of war); *Liberato v. Royer*, 270 U.S. 535 (1926) (holding that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was not in conflict with a treaty with Italy); *Chew Heong v. United States*, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (holding that later immigration law did not have an effect on the treaty right of resident Chinese aliens to reenter the country); *United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey*, 108 U.S. 491, 496 (1883) (“The laws of Congress are always to be construed so as to conform to the provisions of a treaty, if it be possible to do so without violence to their language.”).

251. Sarah H. Cleveland, *Our International Constitution*, 31 *YALE J. INT’L L.* 1, 118 (2006) (citing *Charming Betsy*, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118).

252. *Khan v. Holder*, 584 F. 3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009).

253. *Id.* at 782.

254. *Id.* at 783.

255. *Id.*

international law when interpreting the Constitution. A long-raging debate exists over the proper use of international law in constitutional interpretation that we do not wish to replay. We note only that the debate thus far has relatively little to do with the interpretive enforcement of U.S. legal commitments that we discuss in this Article. Proponents and critics alike have pointed to *Roper v. Simmons* as the exemplar case in the debate.²⁵⁶ That case, however, did not involve interpretive enforcement of international law, as there was no international legal commitment of the United States at issue.²⁵⁷ Several international conventions were cited, but only to demonstrate “the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty.”²⁵⁸ The Court was thus looking to international practice—including foreign law, foreign practice and treaties not ratified by the United States—for insight on difficult questions, much in the way it might use an academic book or article for similar guidance. It was not, however, engaging in interpretive *enforcement*, which can only occur where there is a U.S. treaty commitment to enforce. This requires a directly relevant treaty duly approved by the political branches. It further requires no contrary constitutional text or other clear evidence that the relevant constitutional provision is best read to permit or require a violation of the United States’s international legal obligations under the relevant ratified treaty.

IV. HOW TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AT HOME

The courts of the United States are today less willing than at any previous time in history to directly enforce the Article II treaty obligations of the United States through a private right of action. The decline of such enforcement began in the post-World War II era, but reached its peak only recently as lower courts have begun treating the *Medellin* Court’s statement of a “background presumption” against finding that treaties create private rights as universal. The gap left by the decline in direct enforcement has been filled in part by indirect enforcement, defensive enforcement, and interpretive enforcement. Yet there is more that can be done to ensure that once the United States makes an international legal commitment, it is able to honor that obligation.

Here we offer three proposals to ensure that the United States’s Article II

256. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Other cases that arguably take a similar approach include *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” (citation omitted)); *Thompson v. Oklahoma*, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citing two treaties prohibiting the juvenile death penalty that the United States had signed but not ratified and a third that the U.S. had ratified but that applied only in times of armed conflict and therefore was not directly relevant to the facts of the case); and *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (considering treaties as evidence of “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”).

257. The majority opinion included a brief discussion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but not in the mode of interpretive enforcement. To the contrary, the Court was simply refuting a claim that the 1992 U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) of the Covenant could be read to support the petitioner’s claim that there was no consensus against capital punishment for juveniles in 2005. *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 567. The Court also cited several conventions that the United States had not ratified to demonstrate an international consensus against the juvenile death penalty. *Id.* at 576.

258. *Id.* at 578.

treaty commitments may be more effectively enforced in U.S. courts.²⁵⁹ First, Congress could pass legislation that provides for the judicial enforcement of obligations established in Article II treaties. Alternatively, the President and Congress could make individual international treaty obligations through the ordinary legislative process rather than through Article II. Second, the executive branch could adopt a clear statement rule, which the Legal Advisor's Office of the State Department would apply to newly concluded treaties. Finally, the executive branch could enforce international treaty obligations by seeking injunctions against state and municipal agencies violating those obligations in cases where the United States risks being placed in violation of a national treaty obligation.²⁶⁰

A. Legislative Enactment

It has long been clear that Congress can render a non-self executing treaty obligation enforceable by passing implementing legislation. We propose that Congress harness this widely accepted and uncontroversial rule by passing legislation declaring certain *classes* or *categories* of treaty obligations self-executing and enforceable through private rights of action. For example, a statute might provide a private right of action to enforce a typical provision in private commercial law treaties or might amend the habeas corpus statutes to clarify that they provide a private right of action for particular rights guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions.

We are by no means the first to advocate that Congress pass implementing legislation to ensure the enforceability of treaty obligations that might otherwise be unenforceable in U.S. courts. The American Bar Association and American Society of International Law Joint Task Force on Treaties in U.S. Law²⁶¹ has proposed a statutory mechanism to remedy situations in which there “is an imminent risk of breach” of a treaty because it has been deemed non-self-executing.²⁶² The Task Force was responding to the uncertainties created by the Supreme Court's decision in *Medellin*, and it

259. A fourth possible method not discussed here is for the President to negotiate and sign a sole executive agreement expressly stating that the treaty may be enforced through private rights of action in domestic courts. Such agreements would be permissible, however, only when the treaty from which the President derives his authority expressly grants the President such authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt. c (1987); see also *id.* (asserting that “an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty derives its authority from that treaty and has the same effect as the treaty to supersede an earlier inconsistent federal statute (or an earlier United States agreement) in United States law”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. Prt. No. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 86 (2001) [hereinafter CRS TREATIES REPORT], available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT66922.pdf> (“Numerous agreements pursuant to treaties have been concluded by the Executive, particularly of an administrative nature, to implement in detail generally worded treaty obligations.”); HENKIN, *supra* note 158, at 219-20 n.** (“In such cases it is assumed that the Senate's consent to the treaty implies consent to do so by supplemental executive agreement.”). Yet even within this narrow scope, the precise legal status of such agreements remains in doubt.

260. We focus here on proposals for improving the enforcement of Article II treaties. An alternative approach would be to conclude the agreements as ex post Congressional-Executive Agreements, as argued extensively in Hathaway, *Treaties' End*, *supra* note 14.

261. ABA/ASIL Report, *supra* note 122, at 15.

262. *Id.*

sought to address the range of situations that “may occur in which obligations contained in a treaty . . . cannot be implemented domestically under existing legislation.”²⁶³ It proposed legislation that would “authorize the President to propose implementation measures that would have the effect of binding federal law.”²⁶⁴ The statute would also require Congress to consider the President’s implementation proposals on an expedited basis, so that the problem could be cured quickly.²⁶⁵

Congress is currently considering a bill that would render a more limited legislative fix to the enforcement problems surrounding the Vienna Convention. The Consular Notification Compliance Act is pending, as of this writing, in the Senate Judiciary Committee.²⁶⁶ The Act would ensure that rights to consular notice and access, protected by the Vienna Convention, may be enforced by individuals in U.S. courts in two ways. First, there would be a retrospective remedy for all defendants who, as of the time of the bill’s passage, had been sentenced to death by a U.S. court but had not received timely notice of their consular rights.²⁶⁷ Under section 4(a), individuals “convicted and sentenced to death by any Federal or State court” before the date of enactment of the bill would have one year to file a habeas petition, requesting judicial review of their capital sentences. If the court were to find that a defendant’s consular rights had in fact been violated, proceedings could be postponed in order to allow for consular access.²⁶⁸

This proposed Act is a powerful example of Congress’s capacity to create a legislative solution to allow the enforcement of treaties by individuals in the courts. The bill’s retrospective provision would bring the United States into compliance with the ICJ’s decision in *Avena* by granting defendants collateral reviews to determine whether the denial of consular rights was prejudicial, the very remedy for which the *Avena* Court called.²⁶⁹ Meanwhile, the bill’s

263. *Id.* at 14. Throughout this paper, we have contended that these uncertainties existed prior to the *Medellin* decision.

264. *Id.* at 15.

265. The Task Force summarizes its legislative proposal as follows:

[T]he proposed legislation sets up a mechanism under which the President could propose measures to implement a particular treaty obligation. Under the first alternative, there would be a waiting period before the measures become effective. During that period the Congress could overturn the measures by a joint resolution of disapproval, which would be considered under expedited procedures Under the second alternative, the measures would not become effective unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted — i.e., the equivalent of new implementing legislation—but expedited procedures would be triggered for consideration of such legislation. This would, in effect, allow for the enactment of situation-specific implementing legislation on an expedited basis.

Id. at 15. The Joint Task Force provides a draft of the statutory language in Appendix B of the Report. *Id.* app. B(1).

266. S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011).

267. *Id.* § 4(a).

268. *Id.* § 4(b) (providing that any individual “who is arrested, detained, or held for trial on a charge that would expose the individual to a capital sentence . . . may raise a claim of a violation of Article 36(1)(b) or (c) of the Vienna Convention . . . before the court with jurisdiction over the charge” and that if the court finds that the Vienna Convention has been violated, it “shall postpone any proceedings to the extent the court determines necessary to allow for adequate opportunity for consular access . . .”).

269. See *Hearing on S. 1194 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 112th Cong. 5-6 (2011)

prospective provision would authorize a “defensive” enforcement technique for Vienna Convention-based rights²⁷⁰ similar to those described in Section II.B.

Our proposal builds on—and thus differs from—both the Joint Task Force proposal and the Consular Notification Compliance Act. First, we encourage the passage of statutes that address classes of treaty obligations, rather than just a single treaty. While the Consular Notification Compliance Act demonstrates a Congressional effort to preserve the Vienna Convention’s enforceability in U.S. courts and give effect to the ICJ’s judgment in *Avena*, the statute we have in mind could be broader; it might, for example, declare that certain provisions of bilateral investment treaties will be enforceable in domestic courts.

Second, unlike the Joint Task Force bill, our proposed legislation would not be crafted to address situations in which a risk of treaty breaches is imminent. The Task Force aims to address problems with treaty compliance as they arise, proposing that Congress create a new, expedited review procedure that would be triggered at the President’s discretion. We agree with the Task Force that it is simply infeasible to analyze all existing treaties individually to determine which are vulnerable (because they may be read to be non-self executing and are not implemented through legislation) and then to address these gaps through individualized legislation. However, Congress could prospectively address the judicial enforceability of certain sets of treaty obligations of particular significance. This would have the advantage of providing greater certainty to parties—both state parties to the treaties and private actors affected by the agreements—that are otherwise uncertain about whether they may rely on the United States to meet its obligations.²⁷¹

It is worth noting that our proposal and the Joint Task Force proposal are not mutually exclusive. Our broad-based proactive statutory approach could work in conjunction with the emergency statutory mechanism proposed by the ABA/ASIL Task Force. The Task Force proposal is primarily aimed at unforeseen situations in which there is an imminent risk of breach of an individual treaty. Our proposal, however, is best suited for classes of treaty obligations that can be identified and prospectively addressed to avoid breach in advance.

(statement of Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Bruce C. Swartz). It is worth noting that the Act is already gaining attention in the courtroom. Humberto Leal Garcia is a Mexican national who had been denied his rights to consular notice and access as guaranteed by the Vienna Convention and was then sentenced to death for murder by a Texas court. After the ICJ’s decision in *Avena*, Leal petitioned the Supreme Court (with the United States government filing an amicus brief in his favor) arguing that his execution would amount to a breach of the United States’s obligations under international law. Leal also argued that the Court should use its “All Writs” power to stay his execution until the fate of the Consular Notification Compliance Act was decided. The Court denied the petition on July 7, 2011. *Garcia v. Texas*, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011).

270. *Hearing on S. 1194, supra* note 269, at 6-7 (noting that the bill “shall not be construed to create any additional remedy other than possible postponement” of one’s criminal trial “to allow an opportunity for consular notification and assistance”).

271. Our prospective approach would also avoid any possible legislative veto problem that might be triggered by a mechanism for ex post expedited bicameral review through a joint congressional resolution of approval or disapproval. *See INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a majority of either the House of Representatives or Senate to veto the Attorney General’s decision to suspend deportation of an alien).

One area that might be a focus of the breed of legislation we propose is private commercial international law—particularly treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (sometimes concluded as treaties of “amity”). The recent shift against a presumption of self-execution has the potential to bring about serious consequences for these treaties—and therefore for the country’s international commercial relations. Even during the post-World War II era, courts held that these private commercial law treaties created judicially enforceable private rights of action.²⁷² Recently, however, the D.C. Circuit threw this understanding into doubt when it held that the 1957 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran did not give rise to a private right of action.²⁷³ This decision stands in stark contrast to earlier decisions considering the judicial enforceability of this and similar treaties,²⁷⁴ and in the process upset settled expectations that such treaties would give rise to private rights of action. By passing a statute reaffirming the previously settled expectation that certain individual rights enumerated in Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties give rise to private rights of action in U.S. federal district courts, Congress could remove the cloud of uncertainty that now hangs over these treaties—many of which date back more than one hundred years and form the backbone of longstanding commercial relationships.

Extradition treaties are another example of a class of treaties that should be targeted by our proposed statutory mechanism. Often relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Rauscher*,²⁷⁵ courts have assumed that extradition treaties create private rights that may be enforced defensively or in habeas petitions.²⁷⁶ The Court explicitly held in *Rauscher* that “courts are bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of [the extradition] treaty,”²⁷⁷ and that decision has never been overturned. However, footnote three of *Medellin* might call this conclusion into question. *Medellin* announced not only a presumption against finding that treaties give rise to private rights of action but also a

272. See, e.g., *Asakura v. City of Seattle*, 265 U.S. 322, 341 (1924) (holding that the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Japan “operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts”); *Choi v. Kim*, 50 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the FCN Treaty between Korea and the United States was enforceable in U.S. courts); *Vagenas v. Cont’l Gin Co.*, 988 F.2d 104, 106 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the FCN Treaty between Greece and the United States was enforceable in U.S. courts).

273. *McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For a discussion of the *McKesson* decision, see *supra* Subsection II.C.1. The *Medellin* Court did note that it had held a number of these treaties self-executing, but it stated that it did so “based on ‘the language of the[se] Treat[ies].’” *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 419, 521 (2007).

274. See *supra* note 272; *Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980) (“Plaintiffs can assert their rights to recover damages in this Court for violations of the Treaty and international law. First, the right of individuals and companies to enforce a private right of action in a United States court under the property protection provisions of a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation has consistently been upheld Second, since Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty is self-executing, plaintiffs have a right of action before this Court.”).

275. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). For our discussion of courts’ approaches to the enforcement of extradition treaties in habeas petitions, see *supra* Subsection II.A.3.

276. See, e.g., *Gallo-Chamorro v. United States*, 233 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).

277. 119 U.S. at 419.

presumption against finding that treaties create private rights.²⁷⁸ While extradition treaties affect the rights of individuals, they are not typically phrased to refer to individual rights. Rather, they refer to the relationship of the contracting parties—the states.²⁷⁹ In this respect, an individual's attempt to invoke an extradition treaty in a habeas petition is similar to Medellín's attempt to enforce Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter in U.S. courts. Indeed, the dissent in *Medellin* cited *Rauscher* as an example of a treaty provision similar to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter that the Court has found to be self-executing.²⁸⁰ Given the risk of uncertainty and confusion in this area of law, a statute clarifying private rights arising under extradition treaties would be well advised.

This first proposal is primarily backward-looking. It aims to provide a practical, efficient, and politically feasible solution to the uncertainty created by the Court's decision in *Medellin* for existing treaties. It is aimed, in particular, at treaties that have been assumed by parties and courts to be enforceable but which may not, in fact, be enforced by the courts post-*Medellin*. We now turn to a proposal that is primarily forward-looking. It offers the political branches a mechanism for preventing uncertainty about future enforcement of a treaty at the time of its creation.

B. Clear Statement Rule

In *Medellin*, the Supreme Court concluded that a treaty was not directly enforceable in court unless the treaty contained "explicit textual expression about self-execution."²⁸¹ Read in its most favorable light, the intuition behind this requirement is obvious: If the intention to make a treaty self-executing is not clear from the text of the agreement, how does the court know that the political branches intended to adopt a self-executing treaty? We argue here, however, that the text is one guide to the intentions of the political branches, but it is not the only one. A clear statement by the President and the Senate indicating that they intend the agreement to be self-executing should be regarded as equally compelling evidence that the treaty was intended to be—and should be enforced by the courts as—the Supreme Law of the Land. We call this the Clear Statement Rule.

In an ideal world, when a treaty is intended to be directly enforceable in U.S. courts, the treaty would include explicit language to that effect. This is possible in the context of bilateral treaties, for the United States has only a

278. For an explanation of the distinction, see *supra* Subsection II.A.3.

279. See, for example, the Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Argentina, U.S.-Arg., June 10, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-18, which the President described as "follow[ing] generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States." Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic, Signed at Buenos Aires on June 10, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. 105-18, at III (July 30, 1997), available at http://www.oea.org/juridico/mla/en/traites/en_traites-ext-usa-arg.pdf.

280. *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 556 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

281. *Id.* at 562.

single other party with which it must negotiate the text.²⁸² But in the context of multilateral treaties with numerous signatory parties, including “explicit textual expression about self-execution” may be an impossible task. As scholars have observed and as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in *Medellin*, every country has its own internal laws governing how treaties become law domestically. For that reason, the conventional practice—at least for multilateral treaties—has been *not* to specify matters of self-execution in the text of the legal instrument itself.²⁸³

The Clear Statement Rule offers an alternative approach. Under the new Rule, when the President submits an Article II treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, he will include a statement indicating whether particular obligations in the treaty are understood to be self-executing and whether they should be directly judicially enforced or not. If significant treaty obligations are declared to be non-self-executing, the statement will indicate how they will be enforced instead. The Clear Statement would be embedded in a formal “Declaration” or “Understanding” that would be part of the treaty package approved by the Senate. Including such a statement would ensure that the Senate and President have a shared understanding of the terms of the agreement, and it would also provide clear notice to U.S. treaty partners.²⁸⁴

Our proposed Clear Statement Rule builds on, but modifies, decades-long practices that many U.S. presidents have adopted when negotiating treaties. In 1977, President Carter submitted four human rights treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent, attaching proposed “declarations” that announced those treaties to be non-self-executing.²⁸⁵ The Senate granted its advice and consent to the treaties with the declarations attached. Whatever the merits of the substantive decision to render the agreements non-self-executing, the addition of the declarations had the virtue of eliminating any ambiguity regarding the

282. *E.g.*, Treaty with Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-Austl., pmb., Sept. 5, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-10 (“*Understanding* that the provisions of this Treaty are self-executing in the United States”); Treaty with United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-U.K., pmb., June 21-26, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-7 (same). However, even though these two bilateral treaties included statements of self-execution in their preambles, the Senate ended up conditioning ratification on declarations that the treaties were *not* self-executing. *See* Duncan Hollis, *A Head-Spinning Self-Execution Story*, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 11, 2010), <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/11/11/a-head-spinning-self-execution-story>. The outcome—treaties with a statement of self-execution in the text, coupled with declarations of non-self-execution attached by the Senate—creates a confusing landscape regarding the treaty’s enforcement. While some scholars contend the Senate’s intent should govern, *see id.*, others might disagree. The whole episode suggests that the wiser course of action might be for parties to avoid making statements about self-execution within a treaty’s text altogether, and allow each treaty partner to include statements about self-execution or non-self-execution in their ratification documents. Our Clear Statement Rule would help facilitate the latter type of practice.

283. *See* Curtis A. Bradley, *Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties*, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 543-44 (2008); Vázquez, *supra* note 25, at 679-80. For Justice Breyer’s endorsement of this position, *see Medellin*, 552 U.S. at 547-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

284. Such a practice seems to be emerging already. For example, a tax convention with Hungary on which the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted to recommend the Senate give its advice and consent included a declaration—highlighted and reaffirmed in the Senate Report—that the Convention “is self-executing, as is the case generally with income tax treaties.” Tax Convention with Hungary, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-4, at 4-5 (2011).

285. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. EXEC. DOC. NOS. C, D, E, F, 95-2, at VI, XVIII (1978) (stating that the treaties were not self-executing).

enforceability of the treaties in U.S. courts. Thereafter, that became common practice for human rights treaties. Between 1977 and 2008, the Senate gave its advice and consent to numerous human rights treaties with declarations of non-self-execution appended.²⁸⁶ Moreover, the President and Senate adopted that process for some non-human rights treaties as well.²⁸⁷ Except for one well-known decision in the D.C. Circuit in the 1950s,²⁸⁸ no federal appeals court has ever questioned the validity of a declaration of non-self-execution.²⁸⁹

Declarations of self-execution (as opposed to non-self-execution) are admittedly a newer phenomenon. The President and Senate have begun to attach such declarations to treaties in the wake of *Medellin*,²⁹⁰ but their legal validity has yet to be rigorously assessed by scholars or tested in court. Carlos

286. 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 179, 190, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/25, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.3 (2007) (showing that the Senate added a declaration of non-self execution to the ICCPR in 1992); *id.* at 302-05 (adding the same for the Convention Against Torture in 1994); *id.* at 138 (adding the same for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994); *see also* Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, *Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent*, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 415-16, 419-22 (2000) (arguing that all human rights treaties since the 1970s have had such declarations). *But see* Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 107-4, at 16-18 (2002) (ratified by the Senate with no declaration regarding self-execution).

287. *See* 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, *supra* note 286, at 236, 240 (U.N. Convention Against Corruption); *see also* Curtis A. Bradley, *Self-Execution and Treaty Duality*, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 137 (“Before *Medellin*, the Senate had utilized these formal non-self-execution declarations in connection with a few treaties outside the human rights area as well, but such declarations were uncommon.”).

288. *Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm’n*, 247 F.2d 538, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that the “Niagara Reservation,” which was attached by the Senate to a U.S.-Canada treaty and declared the treaty to be non-self-executing, was a legal nullity because it was “purely domestic” and concluding that the treaty power only authorized the President and Senate to ratify mutual obligations with foreign parties, not to condition the domestic effects of those international agreements through declarations).

289. *E.g.*, *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (assuming in dictum that a declaration of non-self-execution attached to the ICCPR was legally valid); *Auguste v. Ridge*, 395 F.3d 123, 132, 140-42 (3d Cir. 2005) (assuming that the declaration of non-self-execution attached to the Convention Against Torture was legally valid in U.S. courts); Vázquez, *supra* note 283, at 675 (“To date, the lower courts have enforced declarations of non-self-execution without pausing to consider their validity.”). There is an active scholarly debate about the validity of such declarations and reservations. *See, e.g.*, HENKIN, *supra* note 158, at 202 (arguing that the practice of non-self-execution declarations “is anti-Constitutional in spirit and highly problematic as a matter of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bradley & Goldsmith, *supra* note 286, at 415-16, 419-22 (arguing that the Senate and President have a broad constitutional power to limit the domestic effect of treaties as a part of the Treaty Clause power); Malvina Halberstam, *United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1997); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, *Executing the Treaty Power*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1929 (2005) (arguing that in certain instances, when “the treaty power overlaps with Congress’s enumerated powers . . . the greater power to make self-executing treaties includes the lesser power to leave the implementation of a treaty to Congress”); William A. Schabas, *Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?*, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277 (1995); Vázquez, *supra* note 283, at 683 (arguing that “U.S. treaty-makers have the power to ‘unilaterally’ limit the domestic judicial enforceability of the treaties they conclude” through reservations and declarations of non-self-execution, but only as a function of the “reservations” practice at the international level under the Vienna Convention).

290. *See, e.g.*, Tax Convention with Hungary, *supra* note 284, at 5 (“The committee has included one declaration in the recommended resolution of advice and consent. The declaration states that the Convention is self-executing, as is the case generally with income tax treaties.”); *see also* Bradley, *supra* note 287, at 139 (noting that since *Medellin*, “the Senate has for the first time been attaching *self-execution* as well as non-self-execution declarations to its advice and consent to some treaties”).

Vázquez has documented that in 2008, over a dozen treaties were ratified with affirmative declarations of self-execution,²⁹¹ and some declarations even made the important but subtle distinction between self-execution and judicially enforceable rights.²⁹²

The question remains, however, whether such statements are constitutional. The constitutional concern focuses on a small slice of treaties. It involves in particular situations in which a declaration of self-execution would enhance the domestic effect of treaties beyond that required by the treaty, turning an agreement that is by its own terms non-self-executing into a self-executing agreement.²⁹³ That would be problematic for two key reasons. First, it would permit the federal government to use the Treaty Clause power to make domestically enforceable law beyond the bounds of the enumerated powers *without* the full agreement of a foreign government to those terms. In effect, then, it might be seen as an effort to expand the Treaty Clause power of the federal government vis-à-vis the state governments, effectively giving the federal government greater scope to legislate than is constitutionally permissible.²⁹⁴ Second, such a declaration of self-execution could represent an effort by the Senate and President to usurp the power to make federal law without the participation of the House of Representatives. True, the Constitution grants them the power to make treaties without the House, but it does so for reasons specifically connected to the process of making international agreements. And that power is limited in scope by the necessity of gaining a commitment on the part of another state.²⁹⁵ If a unilateral statement of self-execution effectively purports to expand the commitment made in the agreement, the argument goes, it expands the federal legal commitment beyond that contemplated in the Constitution.²⁹⁶

These arguments are not to be dismissed lightly. But it is important to

291. Vázquez, *supra* note 283, at 670. Early examples of this new practice can be found at 154 CONG. REC. S9328–32 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2008) (detailing senatorial advice and consent for mutual legal assistance, extradition, and tax treaties, all of which contain a declaration stating, “This Treaty is self-executing”); Tax Convention with Iceland, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-17, at 7 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-16, at 8 (2008); Protocol Amending 1980 Tax Convention with Canada, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-15, at 10 (2008); Treaty with Malaysia on Mutual Legal Assistance, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-14, at 6 (2008); Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with the European Union, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-13, at 11–21 (2008); and Extradition Treaties with the European Union, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-12, at 10–20 (2008).

292. See, e.g., An Amendment and Three Protocols to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-22, at 14 (2008) (“With the exception of Articles 7 and 8, this Protocol is self-executing. This Protocol does not confer private rights enforceable in United States courts.”).

293. Carlos Vázquez provides a thoughtful analysis of this issue. Vázquez, *supra* note 283, at 685–94 (arguing, *inter alia*, that if *Medellin* is read to establish a default rule that treaties are not self-executing, then “the declarations would . . . purport to make federal law”; and the declarations would be unconstitutional under the separation-of-powers principles, because “the President and Senate do not have the power to make federal law by themselves” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

294. See *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416, 417 (1919).

295. For more on the origins of the Treaty Clause, see Hathaway, *Treaties’ End*, *supra* note 14 and especially David Golove, *Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power*, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).

296. See Vázquez, *supra* note 283, at 687–88. But see Bradley, *supra* note 287, at 154–55 (arguing that “recent *self-execution* declarations attached by the Senate” should be deemed constitutionally valid because the intent of the U.S. treaty-makers, not the collective intent of the treaty parties, should govern).

recognize their scope. The objections apply only to statements that effectively *expand* the legal commitment beyond that contemplated in the international agreement. There is no evidence that the declarations of self-execution have been used in this manner. Similarly, our Clear Statement Rule is intended not to expand the legal obligations beyond those in the agreement but to clearly state that the President and Senate understood the agreement to be judicially enforceable. In effect, where there is a Clear Statement, it operates to flip back the presumption in favor of self-execution. If the text of the treaty unambiguously intends action by the political branches before enforcement—for example, if the treaty expressly requires states to implement the agreement through legislative action—then a Clear Statement that the non-self-executing terms of the treaty are self-executing would not be appropriate. But implementing legislation to make these terms enforceable would be. If the text leaves room for doubt—for example, if it provides that states shall “undertake to comply”²⁹⁷—then a Clear Statement that the treaty is self-executing should be treated with deference by the courts.

As an alternative to our Clear Statement Rule, the President could include a statement about the treaty’s self-executing nature in the treaty transmittal package. This statement would—along with any congressional reports and hearings—become part of the treaty’s legislative history, to which a court could refer in seeking to understand the intent of the political branches. Such an approach would be less ideal than the Clear Statement Rule, but it would offer another avenue for the President to clarify his expectations about a treaty’s enforceability.

There has been significant criticism of presidential signing statements—criticism that might appear to apply to the proposal to encourage the President to address self-execution in the treaty transmittal package.²⁹⁸ Critics regard signing statements as an unlawful expansion of the President’s veto power from the right to say “yes” or “no” to the right to determine the substantive content of statutes.²⁹⁹ These concerns have significantly less force, however, in the

297. This is the treaty language at issue in *Medellin*. Although the Court found that the treaty was not self-executing, it did so by applying a presumption against self-execution. Under our proposal, if there is a clear statement of self-execution, then the presumption is flipped, and the ambiguity resolved in favor of self-execution, rather than against it.

298. In 2006, the American Bar Association issued a report declaring that President George W. Bush’s use of signing statements was threatening the rule of law. See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS & THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1273179616signstate report.pdf. By 2007, President Bush had in fact issued 118 signing statements challenging some provision of a law he had signed. See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33667, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 9 (2007), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf>. Senator Arlen Specter responded with a bill that would have prevented courts from looking to presidential signing statements when interpreting statutes. The Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006). Despite the controversy, lower courts have occasionally looked to such statements. See *United States v. Story*, 891 F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (deferring to a presidential signing statement on the grounds that “the Executive Branch participated in the negotiation of the compromise legislation”); *Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, 761 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1985) (looking to the President’s signing statement in interpreting the Helsinki Accords).

299. E.g., Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, *Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power*, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.

context of treaty ratification. The President has a special role in negotiating treaties that is distinct from his role in the Article I process. For treaties, the President drafts the document's text and consults with foreign parties. Arguably, the President best understands the intentions of treaty partners.³⁰⁰ In part for this reason, federal courts regularly give substantial deference to the executive branch's interpretation of treaties.³⁰¹ In *Kolovrat v. Oregon*, for instance, the Supreme Court looked to "diplomatic notes exchanged between the responsible agencies of the United States and of Yugoslavia" both before and after the treaty was signed, as well as "instructions issued by our State Department" for carrying out the treaty, to conclude that "the 1881 Treaty, now and always, has been construed as providing for inheritance by both countries' nationals . . ."³⁰² According to one scholar, the Supreme Court deferred to the executive branch's interpretation of a treaty in "the vast majority" of the cases he surveyed, except for when the government's view was "poorly reasoned" or called for an unconstitutional result.³⁰³ Moreover, the transmittal package is provided to the Senate prior to seeking its consent, significantly blunting any concern that the President might seek to undermine the Senate through unilateral interpretation.³⁰⁴

Accordingly, presidents can make statements regarding self-execution in the treaty transmittal package and hope that those statements will prove

363, 367 (1987). Others argue in favor of looking to presidential signing statements when interpreting statutes, given that the President plays a key role in the legislative process under the Presentment Clause and that he is therefore part of a statute's "enacting coalition." See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., O.L.C., to The Litigation Strategy Working Group 1 (Feb. 5, 1986), available at <http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf>; Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, *Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power*, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 348 (2006).

300. See William D. Popkin, *Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique*, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 717 n.80 (1991) ("A distinction should also be made between statutes and treaties. The President's power to negotiate treaties might give him an interpretive power that he lacks in the context of legislation."); Jonathan R. Siegel, *The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers*, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1527 n.317 (2000) (arguing that deference to presidential signing statements for treaties—but not statutes—could be justified); Adrian Vermeule, *Interpretive Choice*, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 122 (2000) (arguing that presidential statements do have a "prominent role" in treaty interpretation, but that this is because "the president's role in treaty formation differs importantly from his role in the legislative process . . .").

301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(2) (1987) ("Courts in the United States have final authority to interpret an international agreement for purposes of applying it as law in the United States, but will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch.")

302. 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961); see also *Nielsen v. Johnson*, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) ("The history of article 7 and references to its provisions in diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Denmark [both before and after ratification] leave little doubt that its purpose was both to relieve the citizens of each country from onerous taxes upon their property within the other and to enable them to dispose of such property . . .").

303. David J. Bederman, *Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation*, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 961-62 (1994).

304. This lies in contrast to the executive memorandum at issue in *Medellin*, in which President Bush declared that the ICJ's decision in *Avena* was to be binding on state courts well after the Senate had ratified the treaty. In fact, the Court's analysis rested on the fact that it deemed the memorandum to be an ex post effort to substantively change the terms of the treaty by presidential fiat. 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) ("The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them.").

persuasive to future courts. Nonetheless, such unilateral statements by the President are likely to be less effective and persuasive than a formal Declaration, voted upon by the Senate in the course of the treaty approval process.

Proponents of international law might be concerned that the Clear Statement Rule we propose here will render already-ratified treaties more insecure. If, after all, Clear Statements need to appear at the time of the Senate's advice and consent, and if earlier treaties do not include such statements, then courts may misconstrue the silence in earlier treaties as meaningful. This can be avoided in part by careful wording. For example, a recent Senate report explained that "[t]he declaration states that the Convention is self-executing, as is the case generally with income tax treaties."³⁰⁵ This declaration thus serves to both make clear the intended effect of the treaty at hand and the general nature of tax treaties.

Moreover, the concern that a new practice of Clear Statements will undermine earlier treaties that do not possess such Clear Statements gives judges less credit than they deserve. Prior to *Medellin*, statements of self-execution were not used in many cases because they were considered unnecessary. Post-*Medellin*, the landscape has changed. If the State Department adopts a Clear Statement Rule, and with it a considered practice of including clear information regarding whether the treaty is self-executing or not at the time of the Senate's advice and consent, courts will be able to recognize that the absence of such statements in earlier treaties does not necessarily mean that those treaties were intended to be non-self-executing. The State Department could even further protect against such concerns by issuing an express statement of this new practice, or by revising the relevant regulations. In short, the Clear Statement Rule offers a way of addressing ambiguity about the judicial enforceability of treaties going forward, but should have little or no impact on treaties already ratified.

C. Public Right of Action

The executive branch has the authority to enforce international treaty obligations by seeking an injunction against state and municipal agencies violating those obligations. We call this a "Public Right of Action," in contrast with a private right of action.

The doctrine upon which the Public Right of Action is based arose in a line of cases from the turn of the century that allowed the federal government to sue in equity to enforce its sovereign rights and obligations.³⁰⁶ The cases culminated in the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in *In re Debs*,³⁰⁷ in which the

305. Tax Convention with Hungary, *supra* note 284, at 5.

306. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 811-20 (4th ed. 1996); see also *United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.*, 128 U.S. 315, 367 (1888) (allowing the Attorney General to sue in equity for the revocation of certain fraudulently obtained patents); *United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co.*, 125 U.S. 273 (1888) (same).

307. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).

federal government sought to protect interstate commerce by requesting an injunction prohibiting railroad workers from striking. The Court found sufficient justification for the injunction on the merits, but it concluded that seeking equitable decrees was an appropriate means for the federal government to “enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers.”³⁰⁸ The Court reasoned:

Every government, entrusted by the very terms of its being, with powers and duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other The obligations which it is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court.³⁰⁹

In subsequent years, courts have applied this reasoning to provide the federal government standing to bring lawsuits against public and private actors where the federal government seeks to use the suits to promote the national welfare—by, for example, enforcing civil rights laws and preventing interference with interstate commerce.³¹⁰

The obvious question, of course, is whether the violation of a treaty obligation is the kind of national harm that entitles the federal government to bring an action for injunctive relief against a state or local government. The Supreme Court has suggested that it is, although only in dicta. In *Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States*, the federal government successfully enjoined an Illinois state agency from diverting water from Lake Michigan.³¹¹ Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court that the United States had “a standing in this suit . . . to carry out treaty obligations to a foreign power bordering upon some of the Lakes concerned”³¹² Although the case was resolved on statutory and constitutional grounds, the Court’s endorsement of a Public Right of Action on the basis of treaty violations was clear.³¹³

Despite the breadth of Justice Holmes’s assertion in *Sanitary District*, the Supreme Court has not directly revisited the issue of whether the United States can sue state and local governments to enjoin them from violating treaty obligations.³¹⁴ Several lower courts have addressed the issue, however. The

308. *Id.* at 582.

309. *Id.* This principle had previously been stated by the Court in *American Bell Telephone Co.*, 128 U.S. at 367 (concluding that the government did not need to have a “direct pecuniary interest” in a case, but may sue “to protect the public from the monopoly of the patent which was procured by fraud”).

310. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Republic Steel Corp.*, 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960) (allowing suit by the United States to enjoin respondent companies from depositing industrial solids in the Calumet River without obtaining the requisite permit); *United States v. California*, 332 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1947) (allowing suit by the United States to determine ownership and rights over submerged land); *United States v. City of Jackson*, 318 F.2d 1, 11-16 (5th Cir. 1963), *reh’g denied*, 320 F.2d 870 (1963) (*per curiam*) (granting injunctive relief to the United States to prevent racial segregation); *United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc.*, 194 F. Supp. 897, 902 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (granting preliminary injunction in favor of the United States and enjoining the defendants from interfering with the travel of passengers in interstate commerce).

311. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).

312. *Id.* at 425-26 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

313. *See id.* at 426-32.

314. A year after *Sanitary District*, the Supreme Court held that the United States has “the right to invoke the aid of a court of equity in removing unlawful obstacles to the fulfillment of its

earliest and most direct affirmation of a Public Right of Action to enforce a treaty came from the Eastern District of New York in its 1971 holding in *United States v. City of Glen Cove*.³¹⁵ There, the court held that the federal government could enjoin a city from taxing Soviet assets that were protected by a treaty.³¹⁶ Relying upon *Sanitary District*, the district court held, “the United States may sue to prevent state action which would violate a treaty obligation of the United States,”³¹⁷ explaining that the “conduct of foreign relations would be hampered and embarrassed if the United States Government were powerless to require units of local government to comply with treaty obligations, and if a treaty could be enforced only by the foreign government making itself a party to litigation before state or federal courts.”³¹⁸

Several courts have agreed with the holding in *Glen Cove*. In *United States v. County of Arlington*, for example, the Fourth Circuit held: “[t]he United States can sue to enforce its policies and laws, even when it has no pecuniary interest in the controversy. This principle has been invoked to enable the United States to honor its treaty obligations to a foreign state.”³¹⁹ More recently, in *Mora v. New York*, the Second Circuit noted that the federal government’s ability to “sue state and local governments to ensure compliance” was one of the reasons international treaty obligations have not been entirely “deprive[d] . . . of force” by the lack of a private right of action.³²⁰

Courts have also cited *Sanitary District* in opinions allowing the federal government to intervene in various suits, in order to preserve the nation’s treaty obligations. For instance, in *Tachiona v. United States*, the Second Circuit held that the Department of Justice had standing to intervene and appeal a district court ruling that potentially placed the United States in violation of the U.N. Convention on Privileges and Immunities.³²¹ Similarly, in *Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, a D.C. district court held that the United States could move to quash writs of attachment issued against Iran in a private suit, given the government’s interest in honoring U.S. obligations under the Algiers Accord

obligations.” *United States v. Minnesota*, 270 U.S. 181, 194-95 (1926). Thus, the Court upheld an injunction issued at the request of the Attorney General, enjoining Minnesota state officials from depriving Native Americans of land rights given to them in prior agreements with the federal government. *Id.* The Court, however, was not clear whether the “obligations” owed by the federal government to the Native Americans stem from the international agreements or from the unique fiduciary relationship the Court ascribes to the federal government with regard to Native American groups. *See id.* at 193-96, 207-12; *see also* HENKIN, *supra* note 158, at 484 n.128. Since *Minnesota*, the closest the Court has come to revisiting the matter was Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in *Medellin*, in which he cited *Sanitary District* for the proposition that the Court “has also made clear that the Executive has inherent power to bring a lawsuit ‘to carry out treaty obligations.’” *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 565 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting *Sanitary District*, 266 U.S. at 425-26). The majority opinion neither agreed nor disagreed with Justice Breyer’s statement.

315. 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), *aff’d* 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).

316. *Id.* at 152.

317. *Id.*

318. *Id.*

319. 669 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).

320. 524 F.3d 183, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2008).

321. 386 F.3d 205, 212 (2d Cir. 2004). In *Mora*, the Second Circuit also cited *Sanitary District* in support of the proposition that the United States has authority to bring an action to enforce compliance with a treaty obligation. 524 F.3d at 198.

and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.³²² Both cases cited *Sanitary District*.³²³

There are also recent signs that the government regards a Public Right of Action as a viable option for enforcing treaties. The Legal Adviser to the State Department has contended to the Supreme Court that there is a “longstanding principl[e]” that the United States can “bring an action in court to enforce compliance with a treaty obligation” without statutory authorization.³²⁴ And in a September 2011 report recommending that the Senate ratify a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) with Rwanda,³²⁵ the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations indicated that it shared this view. The report recognized that several provisions of the treaty were not self-executing, such as provisions relating to procedures for resolving disputes under the treaty. But it suggested that the federal government could use a Public Right of Action to enforce the treaty should states refuse to comply. Specifically, the report endorsed the views of the Director of the Office of Investment Affairs for the State Department, who had explained to Congress that “should an arbitral decision [issued pursuant to the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism] conclude that law of a U.S. state is inconsistent with the BIT, the U.S. government could, if necessary, choose to initiate a legal action against the state to ensure compliance with a self-executing provision of the BIT.”³²⁶

The Public Right of Action is thus an option available to the government, but one that is likely to be used sparingly. The key drawback to using the Public Right of Action is that it places the federal government in an adversarial position vis-à-vis a state or local government. That is not only politically challenging, but also can be corrosive of the cooperative federal arrangement that is an essential element of the United States’s political landscape. In many cases, normal political channels—discussions between the federal government and local officials—will prove more effective at changing state or local government behavior to comply with international law obligations of the United States. Indeed, the experience of U.S. compliance with the Vienna Convention’s requirements after *Medellin* shows that these tools can be quite effective, at least in addressing future compliance. There, the federal government advised local prosecutors and police departments about proper

322. 604 F. Supp. 2d 152, 167 (D.D.C. 2009), *aff’d*, 618 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The plaintiffs’ argument that the United States lacks standing in this action is without merit and essentially frivolous. This Circuit has consistently recognized that the United States has standing to bring actions necessary to uphold its foreign policy obligations under international agreements, particularly those relating to Iran.”); *see also* *Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 729 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1984); *Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.D.C. 2003).

323. *Tachiona*, 386 F.3d at 212; *Bennett*, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 167.

324. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, *Bustillo v. Johnson*, 546 U.S. 1213 (2006) (No. 04-10566); *see also* Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984) (citing *Sanitary District*); Brief for the United States in Opposition at 16-17, *Tachiona v. United States*, 126 S. Ct. 2020 (2004) (No. 05-879) (same).

325. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-23.

326. *Id.* at 11.

compliance procedures. Most local governments then began complying with the requirement that foreign citizens' consulates be notified when their citizens are "arrested or committed to prison."³²⁷

Nonetheless, the Public Right of Action remains an important tool—and perhaps a bargaining chip—to be used by the President in instances when a state or local entity has placed the entire country in violation of an international legal obligation and there remains no other reasonable option for redressing the violation. In such cases, the local entity is placing the entire country at risk of sanction or retaliation. That harm can be redressed through a lawsuit to enforce the treaty obligation on the local government that is responsible for creating the violation—and in a position to stop or prevent it. It would have been legally appropriate, for example, (although perhaps politically unimaginable) for the federal government to bring a Public Right of Action against Texas for its violation of the United States's obligations under the Vienna Convention. By failing to abide by the United States's obligations under the Convention, Texas placed U.S. diplomats and citizens abroad at risk of retaliatory violations. Moreover, it damaged the country's reputation for compliance with its international treaty obligations—leading to a unanimous decision by the International Court of Justice that the United States had breached its obligations under the Convention.³²⁸

V. CONCLUSION

Today, more than ever before, international law is a part of daily life. The United States is party to hundreds of Article II treaties, many of them covering topics of the gravest importance to the country, ranging from the economy,³²⁹ to criminal law enforcement,³³⁰ to national security.³³¹ It is thus of no small importance that the Supreme Court has cast the legal status of significant numbers of these treaties into doubt with its decision in *Medellin v. Texas*.

In this Article, we have aimed to bring perspective to *Medellin*—and to the broader debate over the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts—by placing it into context. We have shown that for the first century and a half after the Founding, the courts of the United States presumed that treaties that created

327. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, *supra* note 4, art. 36(1)(b); see MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (2004); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS 7 (3d ed. 2010), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/cna/CNA_Manual_3d_Edition.pdf.

328. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning *Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)*, Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 3, 22 (Jan. 19) (finding "[u]nanimously, . . . that the United States of America has breached the obligation incumbent upon it under the Order indicating provisional measures of 16 July 2008, in the case of Mr. José Ernesto Medellín Rojas").

329. These include the "Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation" treaties discussed above. See *supra* note 148.

330. See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, 104 U.S.T. 1.

331. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-5.

private rights were self-executing and created a private right of action. But this presumption began to erode well before *Medellin*—in no small part in response to the backlash against the post-War human rights revolution that some perceived as a direct threat to racial segregation. *Medellin*, and an overbroad dictum hidden within it, has in the past four years been read by the lower courts not as a simple ratification of this more cautious post-War stance, but as a complete reversal of the Founding Era presumption. Unless corrected, lower courts will likely continue to read *Medellin* to endorse the conclusion that the only treaty that may be directly enforced in court is the rare one that expressly states as much.

Yet this Article also makes clear that the end of direct enforcement of Article II treaties in U.S. courts does not spell the end of *all* enforcement of Article II treaties in U.S. courts. For there remain several ways in which the courts allow treaties to be used even when they do not give rise to a private right of action. We call these “indirect enforcement,” “defensive enforcement,” and “interpretive enforcement,” and we show how they operate to enforce treaty obligations in ways that are not always noticed but are nonetheless deeply influential.

This fuller picture of the enforcement of international law in U.S. courts allows us to see the peaks and the valleys more clearly. We see that the problem is at once more and less dire than sometimes acknowledged—lower courts have made much more than observers predicted of the *Medellin* dictum and yet there remain many ways aside from direct enforcement of treaty obligations to enforce treaties in court. Armed with this more complete understanding of the challenge, we are better positioned to make and evaluate proposals for improving enforcement.

Our proposals acknowledge that the problem of international law enforcement is not simply one for the courts to solve. Our proposals—for legislative enactment, for clear statements by the executive, and for use of the Public Right of Action—call for Congress and the President to respond to a need that is as much within their power and responsibility to address as it is within the courts'. The President and the Senate, after all, concluded the Article II treaties now called into doubt—and they must now work, together with the courts, to put the doubts to rest.