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dc.contributor.authorWeisman, Dennis
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:22.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:58Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:58Z
dc.date.issued1988-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol5/iss1/4
dc.identifier.contextkey8551857
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8364
dc.description.abstractThe divestiture of the Bell system on January 1, 1984, will likely be remembered as the day on which competition in telecommunications markets passed the point of no return. Although the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had been attempting to encourage competition for several decades, January 1, 1984, was the day on which the battle lines were drawn between parent and child. If competition had been only an experiment in selected telecommunications submarkets until that day, the experiment was over. Much like a spark in a dry forest that soon becomes a blazing inferno, the FCC learned there is no such thing as a little competition.
dc.titleDefault Capacity Tariffs: Smoothing the Transitional Regulatory Asymmetries in the Telecommunications Market
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:58Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol5/iss1/4
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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