Incentive Regulation For Electric Utilities
dc.contributor.author | Joskow, Paul | |
dc.contributor.author | Schmalensee, Richard | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:22.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:58:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:58:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1986-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | yjreg/vol4/iss1/2 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 8541924 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8344 | |
dc.description.abstract | Electric utility price regulation in the United States has historically entailed a state regulatory commission overseeing a utility's rate structure by setting an allowed rate of return for the utility on its invested capital. Although state commissions typically have the power to disallow recovery by a utility of imprudently incurred expenses, the current regulatory system was not designed to encourage utilities to control costs. In search of ways to promote efficiency in electricity production, a number of state regulatory commissions have turned their attention from retrospective second-guessing of utility management to "incentive regulation" approaches, which condition financial rewards or penalties upon some measure of a utility's performance. | |
dc.title | Incentive Regulation For Electric Utilities | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Journal on Regulation | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:58:55Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol4/iss1/2 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=yjreg&unstamped=1 |