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dc.contributor.authorJoskow, Paul
dc.contributor.authorSchmalensee, Richard
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:22.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:55Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:55Z
dc.date.issued1986-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol4/iss1/2
dc.identifier.contextkey8541924
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8344
dc.description.abstractElectric utility price regulation in the United States has historically entailed a state regulatory commission overseeing a utility's rate structure by setting an allowed rate of return for the utility on its invested capital. Although state commissions typically have the power to disallow recovery by a utility of imprudently incurred expenses, the current regulatory system was not designed to encourage utilities to control costs. In search of ways to promote efficiency in electricity production, a number of state regulatory commissions have turned their attention from retrospective second-guessing of utility management to "incentive regulation" approaches, which condition financial rewards or penalties upon some measure of a utility's performance.
dc.titleIncentive Regulation For Electric Utilities
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:55Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol4/iss1/2
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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