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dc.contributor.authorGordon, Jeff
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:22.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:55Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:55Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol38/iss4/7
dc.identifier.contextkey23381697
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8342
dc.description.abstractThe Federal Reserve’s recent, unprecedented corporate debt purchases will further reduce the cost of corporate debt relative to equity. Given the already high degree of leverage in the corporate sector, I argue that this is a dangerous policy choice. However, the best solution is not to outlaw the Fed’s crisis actions, but to reform other federal laws that create a debt bias in aggregate. I show how limiting the corporate interest deduction to those firms with a responsible debt-equity ratio would harmonize the goals of tax policy and bailout policy, establishing a coherent “capital structure policy” for the first time.
dc.titleCoherent Capital Structure Policy: Between Bailouts and the Interest Deduction
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:55Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol38/iss4/7
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1594&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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