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dc.contributor.authorBarreca, Emily
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:21.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:48Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:48Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol37/iss1/7
dc.identifier.contextkey16081149
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8302
dc.description.abstractShareholder primacy has long dominated American legal thought and politics across the ideological spectrum. Over the past several years, however, U.S. political progressives have begun to criticize shareholder primacy, arguing that corporations should also serve other stakeholders. This Note conducts the first academic analysis of this emerging movement’s executive compensation policy proposals. This Note finds that stakeholder-primacy progressives have failed to propose policies that would effectively regulate executive compensation. Given the connection between rising executive compensation and economic inequality, this finding is surprising and concerning. The final Part develops an original executive compensation policy proposal for the progressive stakeholder primacy movement.
dc.titleAccountable Compensation: The Progressive Case for Stakeholder-Focused, Board-Empowering Executive Compensation Laws
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:48Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol37/iss1/7
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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