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dc.contributor.authorHaeberle, Kevin S.
dc.contributor.authorHenderson, M. Todd
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:21.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol35/iss2/2
dc.identifier.contextkey12811370
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8267
dc.description.abstractIt has long been said that market forces alone will result in a problematic under-sharing of information by public companies. Since the 1930s, the main regulatory response to this market failure has come in the form of the massive mandatory-disclosure regime that sits at the foundation of modern securities law. But this regime--especially when viewed along with its speech-chilling antifraud overlay-no doubt leaves society without all the corporate information from which it would benefit. The typical fix offered to the problem has been more of the same: add to the 100-plus-page list of what firms must disclose, often based on the latest Washington fad.
dc.titleMaking a Market for Corporate Disclosure
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol35/iss2/2
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1518&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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