Eliminating Conflicts of Interests in Banks: The Significance of the Volcker Rule

dc.contributor.author	Avci, S. Burcu
dc.contributor.author	Schipani, Cindy A.
dc.contributor.author	Seyhun, H. Nejat
dc.date	2021-11-25T13:35:21.000
dc.date.accessioned	2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.date.available	2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.date.issued	2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifier	yjreg/vol35/iss2/1
dc.identifier.contextkey	12811366
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8266
dc.description.abstract	Public policy has been focused on controlling the conflicts of interests in banks for the last eighty-five years with limited success. Banks have a unique place in the economy as intermediaries between investors and companies, allowing them to obtain significant private, proprietary information. Public policy is focused on trying to ensure that banks do not misuse this information for their own benefit to the detriment of their clients. This is a tough task.
dc.title	Eliminating Conflicts of Interests in Banks: The Significance of the Volcker Rule
dc.source.journaltitle	Yale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA	2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage	https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol35/iss2/1
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext	https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1517&context=yjreg&unstamped=1

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