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dc.contributor.authorWiseman, Hannah J.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:21.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol35/iss1/5
dc.identifier.contextkey12811339
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8263
dc.description.abstractMuch of the scholarly literature lauds cooperative federalism, in which states regulate to achieve federal standards, as an innovative federal-state partnership. But delegation of authority also has grave dangers caused by principal-agent problems, among others. The largely toothless nondelegation doctrine captures these challenges, but the bidirectional difficulties of principals adequately monitoring agencies, and vice versa, extend far beyond Congress's delegation of duties to agencies.
dc.titleDelegation and Dysfunction
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:42Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol35/iss1/5
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1514&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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