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dc.contributor.authorAwrey, Dan
dc.contributor.authorClarke, Blanaid
dc.contributor.authorGriffith, Sean J.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:21.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:41Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:41Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol35/iss1/1
dc.identifier.contextkey12811331
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8259
dc.description.abstractRegulation by litigation has driven U.S. merger regulation to crisis. The reliance on private lawsuits to police disclosures and potential conflicts of interest in mergers, takeovers, and other control transactions has resulted in the filing of claims after every major transaction. However, it has failed to achieve meaningful benefits for shareholders and has instead deprived them of potentially valuable rights. Regulation by litigation has devolved into attorney rent-seeking, and the raft of substantive and procedural reforms aimed at resolving the crisis has failed.
dc.titleResolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:41Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol35/iss1/1
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1511&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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