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dc.contributor.authorHirst, Scott
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:21.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:38Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:38Z
dc.date.issued2017-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol34/iss1/3
dc.identifier.contextkey10230038
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8245
dc.description.abstractIn 2012, the New York Stock Exchange changed its policies to prevent brokers from voting shares on corporate governance proposals when they have not received instructions from beneficial owners. Although the change was intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance, it has had the opposite effect: a significant number of U.S . public companies are no longer able to amend important parts of their corporate charters, despite the support of their boards of directors and overwhelming majorities of shareholders. Their charters are frozen.
dc.titleFrozen Charters
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:39Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol34/iss1/3
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1496&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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