Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDamaska, Mirjan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:18.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:36:15Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:36:15Z
dc.date.issued1998-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/1575
dc.identifier.contextkey1759386
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/813
dc.description.abstractAs the century limps to a close, the gap seems to be widening between the views on truth prevailing in a variety of theoretical disciplines and the understanding of truth in the social practice of adjudication. One of the working assumptions of the practice of adjudication is that truth is in principle discoverable, and that accuracy in fact-finding constitutes a precondition for a just decision. But influential currents of contemporary thought are skeptical of truth as a philosophical principle, and they doubt that the acquisition of objective knowledge is possible. Due to the unsettling force of this skepticism, legal scholars are beginning to wonder whether aspiration to objective knowledge is a realistic goal of factual inquiries in adjudication.
dc.titleTruth in Adjudication
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:36:15Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1575
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2597&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Truth_in_Adjudication.pdf
Size:
1.201Mb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record