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dc.contributor.authorPavlov, Andrey
dc.contributor.authorWachter, Susan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:20.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:15Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:15Z
dc.date.issued2009-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol26/iss2/11
dc.identifier.contextkey8652912
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8105
dc.description.abstractWith private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS), investors bore default risk. This risk should have been priced. As systemic risk grew, why didn't the pricing of risk increase? We point to market institutions' incentive misalignments that cause asset prices to rise above fundamentals, producing systemic risk. The model attributes the asset price inflation to the provision of underpriced credit as lending institutions misprice risk to gain market share. The resulting asset price inflation itself then generates further expansion of underpriced credit.
dc.titleSystemic Risk and Market Institutions
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:15Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol26/iss2/11
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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