Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHeller, Michael
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:19.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:58:04Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:58:04Z
dc.date.issued2005-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol22/iss2/4
dc.identifier.contextkey8609134
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8055
dc.description.abstractThe United States is losing its competitive edge in telecommunications partly because of FCC mistakes in fragmenting property rights in, and in the regulatory oversight of local telephone facilities and services. As with post-socialist transition, reformers created a "tragedy of the anticommons" in which too many owners and regulators each can block the others' investments and all players forego innovation. By forcing existing companies to unbundle network elements (UNEs) and sell them too cheaply, the FCC has created an industry where the players cannibalize the legacy network, divert resources to regulatory arbitrage, and have little incentive for bold new investments.
dc.titleThe UNE Anticommons: Why the 1996 Telecom Reforms Blocked Innovation and Investment
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:58:05Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol22/iss2/4
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1213&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
12_22YaleJonReg275_2005_.pdf
Size:
741.3Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record