Governments presumably institute regulatory systems to serve the interests of the public. Sometimes, however, the interests of individual regulators may diverge from those of the public. For example, because regulated industries typically are better organized than the consumers of their products or services, a regulator may maximize his political support by serving the interests of the regulated industry instead of consumer interests. Pluralist commentators on this regulatory dilemma have suggested that subjecting regulators to greater public accountability would reduce the incentives for such behavior. They recommend that, since specialized political interests have less influence over the elective process than over appointments, regulators should be elected rather than appointed.
The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different
formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.
By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.
To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export.
The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.
After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.