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dc.contributor.authorHasen, David
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:19.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:57:50Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:57:50Z
dc.date.issued2000-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol17/iss2/4
dc.identifier.contextkey8557399
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/7990
dc.description.abstractMuch of the commentary on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has focused on the nature of power that agencies exercise when they promulgate rules that merit judicial deference under Chevron. Some scholars view Chevron as reading into statutes an implied delegation from Congress to agencies of legislative power to fill statutory gaps and interpret statutory ambiguities. Other scholars understand Chevron as, in effect, a delegation of interpretive power from the courts to agencies. This Article argues that neither view of Chevron is correct.
dc.titleThe Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:57:50Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol17/iss2/4
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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