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dc.contributor.authorAbramowicz, Michael
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:19.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:57:44Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:57:44Z
dc.date.issued1998-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjreg/vol15/iss2/2
dc.identifier.contextkey8777115
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/7962
dc.description.abstractIn administrative law, the market paradigm has led to revolution, as policymakers have followed commentators in turning from command-andcontrol regulation to incentives. This reconceptualization, however, has left one aspect of administrative law untouched: administrative adjudication. This neglect is unjustified, as the Article shows that adjudication itself could be accomplished through market processes. In an administrative market, the government would auction off rights to a fraction of any judgment award that an administrative agency might ultimately win against a given corporation. Such a market would reward third-party efforts to gather relevant information by allowing those possessing private information to trade on it. With further refinement, the government could use this market to determine what the final judgment against the corporation should be, thus supplanting traditional adjudication
dc.titleMarket-Based Administrative Enforcement
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:57:44Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol15/iss2/2
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1461&context=yjreg&unstamped=1


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