EXPLOIT DERIVATIVES & NATIONAL SECURITY
dc.contributor.author | SCHWALB, MICAH | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:18.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:57:23Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:57:23Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | yjolt/vol9/iss1/5 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 3010842 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/7864 | |
dc.description.abstract | Critical infrastructures remain vulnerable to cyber attack despite a raft of post-9/l] legislation focused on cyber security in critical infrastructures. An emerging discipline known as the "economics of information security" may provide a partial solution in the form of a hypothetical market that trades "exploit derivatives, " a modified futures contract tied to cyber security events. This paper argues that such a market could serve to predict and prevent cyber attacks through the operation of the efficient capital market hypothesis, but only after changes to the present regulatory environment. Specifically, I argue that a statutory safe harbor would allow the creation of a pilot market focused on vulnerabilities in Internet protocol version six, an emerging communications standard that China hopes to deploy throughout its national network before the 2008 Olympics. Indeed, such a safe harbor would align the interests of military and civilian policymakers on the common goal of protecting critical infrastructure from a computer network attack originating in China, whether instigating by the People's Liberation Army or so-called "black-hat" hackers. | |
dc.title | EXPLOIT DERIVATIVES & NATIONAL SECURITY | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Journal of Law and Technology | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:57:23Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol9/iss1/5 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=yjolt&unstamped=1 |