A MODEST DEFENSE OF MIND READING
dc.contributor.author | Brennan-Marquez, Kiel | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:17.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:57:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:57:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-07-09T06:56:55-07:00 | |
dc.identifier | yjolt/vol15/iss2/3 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 4297258 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/7785 | |
dc.description.abstract | The last decade has witnessed a profusion of commentary on “mind-reading” devices. Instead of offering traditional legal arguments against such devices, most scholars have simply assumed their use to be unconstitutional. The consensus is clear: by essentially “speaking for” defendants, mind-reading devices offend the basic spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause. In this Article, I defend the constitutionality of mind-reading on both doctrinal and normative grounds. First, I reconstruct the Court’s self-incrimination jurisprudence to demonstrate that evidence is only “testimonial” — and thus, privileged — if it involves a “communicative act” from the suspect. Whether or not particular types of mind-reading devices would elicit “communicative acts” is a narrow, technology-specific question. And at least some mind- reading devices almost certainly would not – making their use permissible under the Fifth Amendment. Second, I defend this doctrinal result against normative attack. Many different accounts of the privilege’s theoretical underpinnings exist. I evaluate these accounts in turn, arguing that some are inapposite to mind reading, while others fail in a deeper sense. | |
dc.title | A MODEST DEFENSE OF MIND READING | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Journal of Law and Technology | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:57:05Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss2/3 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=yjolt&unstamped=1 |