Woman (Modified)
dc.contributor.author | Christian, Susan | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:10.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:54:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:54:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-10-16T12:16:16-07:00 | |
dc.identifier | yjlf/vol4/iss1/16 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 7734263 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/7148 | |
dc.description.abstract | Justice has been the demand of most movements advocating social change. Justice for women is the essential demand of feminism. There has been, however, constant disagreement among feminists about what the phrase "justice for women" actually means. This argument has both legitimate and illegitimate aspects. It has encompassed the legal issue, also relevant to theory, of whether justice requires the same treatment for both genders, or whether the realization of justice demands recognition of the overarching and systemic social inequities which distinguish the experiences of women from those of men. The debate has also entertained what I view to be a much less legitimate argument, one which essentially asks: which type of woman deserves to represent Women? Stated differently, the question has been "what type of woman would be the exemplar-the 'poster girl'-for the feminist struggle?" Thus has the ideal of feminism devolved from its radical essence-justice for all women-to become a tool of racial and class antagonism | |
dc.title | Woman (Modified) | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Journal of Law & Feminism | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:54:52Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlf/vol4/iss1/16 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=yjlf&unstamped=1 |