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dc.contributor.authorKleiner, Samuel
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:06.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:53:35Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:53:35Z
dc.date.issued2014-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjil/vol39/iss2/5
dc.identifier.contextkey9345363
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/6675
dc.description.abstractThis Note argues that the US. President can utilize military force for operations "short of war" based on a UN. Security Council Resolution without congressional authorization. In the post-WWII era, Presidents have relied on U.N. Security Council resolutions to argue that they have the constitutional power to use military force without Congress. In the Korean War and the Gulf War, the President argued that the Executive had the power to launch a full-scale war based on a UN. Resolution without going to Congress. In interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Libya, the President has argued that the Executive has the power to use military force short of war to uphold the US. national interest in enforcing a UN Security Council Resolution. However, no scholar has examined this issue in over fifteen years. This Note argues that the President has the constitutional power to conduct military operations "short of war" without congressional authorization if the military action is based on a UN. Security Council Resolution.
dc.titleThe Commander-in-Chief and the United Nations: Why the President Can Use the United Nations Security Council as the Constitutional Basis for Military Operations Short of War
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal of International Law
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:53:35Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol39/iss2/5
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1451&context=yjil&unstamped=1


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