• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Yale
    • Yale Journal of International Law
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Yale
    • Yale Journal of International Law
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of openYLSCommunitiesPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    Display statistics

    Supplying Compliance: Why and When the United States Complies with WTO Rulings

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    12_39YaleJIntlL201_2014_.pdf
    Size:
    3.070Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Author
    Brewster, Rachel
    Chilton, Adam
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/6672
    Abstract
    In studies of compliance with international law, the focus is usually on the "demand side "-that is, how to increase the pressure on the state to comply. Less attention has been paid, however, to the consequences of the "supply side "-who within the state is responsible for the compliance. This Article is one of the first studies to systematically address the issue of how different actors within the US. government alter national policy in response to the violations of international law. The Article does so by examining cases initiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). This Article presents empirical evidence that who within the government must supply compliance is the most important factor in explaining both whether and when the U.S. government complies with WTO rulings, even after controlling for important characteristics of the state filing the request and the political importance of the affected industry. These results demonstrate that understanding the domestic supply of compliance is a critical, if neglected, aspect of international law theory. The results also highlight how the dominant "unitary actor" model (adopted by international law scholars to explain compliance) obscures important causal pathways in the compliance process. This Article opens up a new and rich field of study into what makes international law effective or ineffective.
    Collections
    Yale Journal of International Law

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2023)  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.