Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorConnell, Paul
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Tian
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:06.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:53:34Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:53:34Z
dc.date.issued2014-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjil/vol39/iss1/6
dc.identifier.contextkey9345229
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/6668
dc.description.abstractWith increasing injections of foreign capital in the United States and rising national security concerns, the legislative and executive branches have played an expanded role in policing international investment in American companies. Arguably, no government group serves a more critical gatekeeping role than the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Yet, its evaluative process, which permits it to examine and block any foreign attempt to garner control of an American entity, is completely obscured from the public purview. However, the Committee's secrecy does not preclude all studies of its review process. Using various government databases and reports, this Note produces one of the first empirical analyses of the CFIUS process. This Notes show through event studies that CFIUS actions lead to large protectionist wealth transfers, and the regression analysis indicates that despite claims of discriminatory application against certain nations, CFIUS denials are best explained by factors relating to valid concerns about national security.
dc.titleAn Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal of International Law
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:53:34Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol39/iss1/6
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1443&context=yjil&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
07_39YaleJIntlL131_2014_.pdf
Size:
1.996Mb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record