Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities
dc.contributor.author | Macey, Jonathan | |
dc.contributor.author | Miller, Geoffrey | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:17.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:35:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:35:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1995-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/1433 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 1737109 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/657 | |
dc.description.abstract | Professors Macey and Miller explore the relationship between deposit insurance and the mismatch in the term structure of commercial banks I assets and liabilities. After critiquing the traditional regulatory hypothesis, which posits that banks have incentives to.fund long-term assets with short-term liabilities because government-sponsored deposit insurance enhances bank credit and subsidizes short-term liabilities, they use public choice theory to argue that a modified version of the regulatory hypothesis is the best explanation for the mismatch in the term structure of banks I assets and liabilities. Finally, they argue that embracing the regulatory hypothesis does not imply acceptance of the government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme as it exists in the U. S. today. | |
dc.title | Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:35:48Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1433 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2454&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |