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dc.contributor.authorMacey, Jonathan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:17.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:35:48Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:35:48Z
dc.date.issued1994-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/1432
dc.identifier.contextkey1737118
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/656
dc.description.abstractThe point of this Article is to show that mediating institutions are better decision makers than individuals. For this reason, individuals often find it in their interest to select a variety of mediating institutions (corporations, investment funds, unions, political parties, religious institutions, etc.) to act as their agents. These mediating institutions will choose packages of preferences on behalf of their principals.
dc.titlePackaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:35:48Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1432
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2455&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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