Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAyres, Ian
dc.contributor.authorMacey, Jonathan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:04.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:53:10Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:53:10Z
dc.date.issued2005-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjil/vol30/iss2/6
dc.identifier.contextkey9285646
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/6517
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the politics and finance of development among Middle Eastern countries with particular emphasis on the incentives of autocrats to advance pro-growth policies in general and to foster small enterprise in particular. It is premised on the observation that there is no fundamental reason why Middle Eastern economies cannot enjoy steady, stable economic growth. At several points in the past, particularly in the late 1970s, various Middle Eastern economies, including Iraq, enjoyed middleincome status. From the 1960s until the end of the 1970s, Middle Eastern countries made massive public investments in economic infrastructure, as well as in health, education and, less successfully, in state-owned enterprises. Economic growth, at six percent per worker per year, was the highest in the world in the 1960s. Going back much further, during the tenth century the Middle East was extremely advanced as measured by its standard of living, technology, agricultural output, and literacy rates.
dc.titleInstitutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic Development in the Middle East
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal of International Law
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:53:10Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol30/iss2/6
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1255&context=yjil&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
15_30YaleJIntlL397_2005_.pdf
Size:
2.288Mb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record