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dc.contributor.authorSlye, Ronald
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:03.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:52:45Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:52:45Z
dc.date.issued1996-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjil/vol21/iss2/6
dc.identifier.contextkey9205537
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/6362
dc.description.abstractIt has been almost five years since the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. An estimated.200,000 civilians have been killed, over two million people have been displaced from their homes, tens of thousands have been tortured and raped, and Europe has hosted yet another of the world's genocides. While the recently concluded Dayton Peace Agreement has resulted in a temporary cessation of the armed conflict, serious concerns have been raised regarding efforts to rebuild and repair the institutions of civil society. Little attention has been paid, however, to the constitutional structure of the newly created state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the long term viability of the region depends on a number of factors, the constitutional structure of the government, and its allocation of power among the parties to the peace agreement, is crucial for the long term viability of an independent Bosnian state. This Comment examines only one aspect of the constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the institutionalization of ethnicity.
dc.titleThe Dayton Peace Agreement: Constitutionalism and Ethnicity
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal of International Law
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:52:45Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol21/iss2/6
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=yjil&unstamped=1


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