Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism
dc.contributor.author | Stone Sweet, Alec | |
dc.contributor.author | Mathews, Jud | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:16.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:35:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:35:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-03-11T00:00:00-07:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/14 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 456614 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/619 | |
dc.description.abstract | Over the past fifty years, proportionality balancing – an analytical procedure akin to “strict scrutiny” in the United States – has become the dominant technique of rights adjudication in the world. From German origins, proportionality analysis spread across Europe, into Commonwealth systems (Canada, New Zealand, South Africa), and Israel; it has also migrated to treaty-based regimes, including the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the World Trade Organization. Part I proposes a theory of why judges are attracted to the procedure, an account that blends strategic and normative elements. Parts II and III provide a genealogy of proportionality, trace its global diffusion, and evaluate its impact on law and politics in a variety of settings, both national and supranational. In the conclusion, we discuss our major finding, namely, that proportionality constitutes the doctrinal underpinning for the expansion of judicial power globally. ! Indeed, judges who adopting it position themselves to exercise dominance over both policymaking and constitutional development. | |
dc.title | Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:35:42Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/14 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |