Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States

Abstract

The Reagan Administration considers verifiability of Soviet compliance to be an essential feature of any arms control agreement it would be willing to make with the Soviet Union. While numerous methods of arms control verification exist, on-site inspections might be a means of ensuring that all parties are strictly observing the provisions of an agreement. As a result, Reagan Administration arms control negotiators have pressed the Soviets to agree to on-site inspections in several of the agreements under discussion. In addition to the Soviet Union's historical opposition to on-site inspection, based in part upon fears of espionage, the U.S. Constitution's limitations on governmental power are also potential obstacles to on-site inspection in this country. The purpose of this article is to examine the constitutionality of on-site inspections as contained in one of these agreements-the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Draft Convention).