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dc.contributor.authorFalk, Richard
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:01.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:52:07Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:52:07Z
dc.date.issued1985-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryjil/vol10/iss2/3
dc.identifier.contextkey9304521
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/6135
dc.description.abstractThe idea of normative restraint is associated with the acceptance by governments, especially those representing the leading states, of substantive and procedural restrictions on their discretion to wage war, not as a matter of morality, but as a matter of law. The Kellogg-Briand Treaty, the Nuremberg Judgment, and the Charter of the United Nations formalized the renunciation of non-defensive claims to use force to resolve international disputes with other governments.
dc.titleThe Decline of Normative Restraint in International Relations
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal of International Law
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:52:07Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol10/iss2/3
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1326&context=yjil&unstamped=1


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