Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act
| dc.contributor.author | Macey, Jonathan | |
| dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:16.000 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:35:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:35:41Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
| dc.identifier | fss_papers/1391 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Jonathan R Macey, Positive political theory and federal usurpation of the regulation of corporate governance: The coming preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951 (2004). | |
| dc.identifier.contextkey | 1724173 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/611 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This Article is about the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a political entity. The basic story is that the SEC, like other administrative agencies, is a creature of the political system, and, as such, responds in varying ways to political pressure. From this starting point, I observe that the SEC is no exception among regulatory agencies in having a keen interest in maximizing its own power and prestige. As such, the SEC is responsive to political pressures. | |
| dc.title | Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act | |
| dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:35:41Z | |
| dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1391 | |
| dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2408&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |
