Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMacey, Jonathan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:16.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:35:41Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:35:41Z
dc.date.issued2005-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/1391
dc.identifier.contextkey1724173
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/611
dc.description.abstractThis Article is about the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a political entity. The basic story is that the SEC, like other administrative agencies, is a creature of the political system, and, as such, responds in varying ways to political pressure. From this starting point, I observe that the SEC is no exception among regulatory agencies in having a keen interest in maximizing its own power and prestige. As such, the SEC is responsive to political pressures.
dc.titlePositive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:35:41Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1391
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2408&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Positive_Political_Theory_and_ ...
Size:
1003.Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record