The Law of Unintended Consequences: A Critique of the Dilutive Effects and Efficiency Costs of Multilayer Regulation
dc.contributor.author | Podolyako, Ilya | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:58.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:50:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:50:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009-04-29T00:00:00-07:00 | |
dc.identifier | student_papers/91 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 838084 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/5698 | |
dc.description.abstract | This Article examines the role obstruction charges play in the regulatory framework covering modern public corporations and their members. It finds that prosecutors’ reliance on obstruction charges undermines the legitimacy of substantive rules for enterprise behavior. This pattern not only causes significant inefficiency on its own, but indicates a broader problem with multilayer regulation. That is, in a previously regulated arena, the pre-existing legal environment may warp a new set of rules in undesirable ways. The Article concludes by proposing a means to address this problem generally and remove unnecessary costs associated with the compliance regime specifically. | |
dc.title | The Law of Unintended Consequences: A Critique of the Dilutive Effects and Efficiency Costs of Multilayer Regulation | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Student Scholarship Papers | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:50:55Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/91 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=student_papers&unstamped=1 |