Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorNg, Kay
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:58.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:50:51Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:50:51Z
dc.date.issued2007-10-23T00:00:00-07:00
dc.identifierstudent_papers/56
dc.identifier.contextkey385728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/5672
dc.description.abstractThis Note has two goals. First, it seeks to explain why boards of directors at large corporations tend to stay passive in performing their monitoring role. Second, this Note argues that Delaware corporate law fails to take into consideration the factors that lead to board passivity because Delaware courts currently adopt a transaction-focused approach by only examining facts surrounding the transaction that is the subject of litigation. This Note proposes that the Delaware court looks beyond the transaction in dispute and adopts an expansive good faith evaluation for overall board operations.
dc.titleInside the Boardroom: A Proposal to Delaware's Good Faith Jurisprudence to Improve Board Passivity
dc.source.journaltitleStudent Scholarship Papers
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:50:51Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/56
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=student_papers&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Inside_the_Boardroom.pdf
Size:
141.0Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record