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dc.contributor.authorMadl, Amy C.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:56.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:49:35Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:49:35Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierjregonline/5
dc.identifier.contextkey19395022
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/5442
dc.description.abstractKiller instinct is a key business asset. Firms live and die by their strategic choices, and the desire to outcompete rivals colors most business decisions. While many firms strive to win market share on their merits, economists have recently identified an anti-competitive practice—killer acquisition—that enables incumbents to maintain market share by burying,rather than beating, rival technologies. In these acquisitions, firms buy competitors to prevent market cannibalization, preserving profits at a price that is right for both the acquirer and the target.
dc.titleKilling Innovation?: Antitrust Implications of Killer Acquisitions
dc.source.journaltitleYale Journal on Regulation Online Bulletin
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:49:35Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/jregonline/5
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=jregonline&unstamped=1


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