Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness
dc.contributor.author | Amar, Akhil | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:55.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:49:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:49:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1996-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/936 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 1664757 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/5352 | |
dc.description.abstract | Call me silly. In fact, call me terminally silly. For despite Justice Scalia's remarkably confident claim, I believe, and shall try to prove below, that the Romer Court majority opinion invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2 was right both in form and in substance, both logically and sociologically. I stress "form" and "logic" at the outset because I share Justice Scalia's belief in the importance of these things in constitutional adjudication. I also share his commitment to constitutional text, history, and structure, and his suspicion of "free-form" constitutionalism. And so I shall highlight the text, history, and spirit of a constitutional clause that - though not explicitly invoked by the Romer majority - clarifies and supports the majority's theory: the Article I, section 10 Attainder Clause. My claim is not that the Equal Protection Clause, relied upon by the Romer Court, was incapable of doing the work; but that the sociology and principles underlying the Attainder Clause powerfully illuminate the facts of Romer, the opinions in Romer, and the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause itself. | |
dc.title | Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:49:20Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/936 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1901&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |