Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review and Why it May Not Matter
dc.contributor.author | Sweet, Alec | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:54.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:48:58Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:48:58Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/81 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 1260877 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/5213 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this Article, I explore the question of why constitutional review, but not American judicial review, spread across Europe. I will also argue that, despite obvious organic differences between the American and European systems of review, there is an increasing convergence in how review actually operates. I proceed as follows. In Part I, I examine the debate on establishing judicial review in Europe, focusing on the French. In Parts II and III, I contrast the European and the American models of review, and briefly discuss why the Kelsenian constitutional court diffused across Europe. In Part IV, I argue that despite important formal, institutional distinctions, there is increasing convergence in how the two systems of review actually operate. | |
dc.title | Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review and Why it May Not Matter | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:48:58Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/81 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |