• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship
    • Faculty Scholarship Series
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship
    • Faculty Scholarship Series
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of openYLSCommunitiesPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    Display statistics

    Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    Corruption_and_Post_Conflict_P ...
    Size:
    2.331Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Author
    Rose-Ackerman, Susan
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4976
    Abstract
    States emerging from conflict generally have very weak institutions and an influx of outside funds. These two conditions provide incentives for officials to make corrupt deals for personal gain. Outsiders who are brought in to monitor and manage the transition are also at risk of becoming corrupt. The prior conflict is likely to have fostered a culture of secrecy and impunity where self-dealing is easy to conceal. The end of the conflict may not encourage the development of a transparent and accountable government, especially if those who gained financially from the conflict are in power and seek both to preserve past gains and to benefit from the rebuilding effort. Thus, although incentives for corruption exist in all societies, the incidence and scale of corruption may be especially high and destructive in post-conflict situations. Political leaders buy-off powerful private actors with patronage, including criminal groups and wealthy business interests. Those powerful private actors also buy off weak politicians with money or promises of future jobs and business ventures. The post-conflict political system may be in a corruption trap where payoffs build in expectation of future payoffs, resulting in a vicious spiral.
    Collections
    Faculty Scholarship Series

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2023)  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.