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dc.contributor.authorListokin, Yair
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:51.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:48:11Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:48:11Z
dc.date.issued2009-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/560
dc.identifier.contextkey1628043
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4940
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the relation between two means of corporate information aggregation—corporate voting and stock market pricing. If the median voter and the price-setting shareholder share similar information, then close proxy contest outcomes should not have systematic effects on stock prices. The paper shows, however, that close dissident victories cause positive movements in stock prices, while close management victories lead to negative price effects. The median voter values management control more than the price-setting shareholder. Voting and market pricing aggregate information in very different ways, with important implications for the role of voting and market pricing in corporate law.
dc.titleCorporate Voting vs. Market Price Setting
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:48:11Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/560
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1552&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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