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dc.contributor.authorLangbein, John
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:51.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:48:02Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:48:02Z
dc.date.issued1979-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/534
dc.identifier.contextkey1627806
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4882
dc.description.abstractThe present Article demonstrates the error of this universalist theory of plea bargaining by showing how and why one major legal system, the West German, has so successfully avoided any form or analogue of plea bargaining in its procedures for cases of serious crime. The German criminal justice system functions without plea bargaining not by good fortune, but as a result of deliberate policies and careful institutional design whose essential elements are outlined in Part I. Part II addresses the American claims that a clandestine plea bargaining system lurks behind veils of German pretense.
dc.titleLand without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:48:02Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/534
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1532&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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