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dc.contributor.authorPilaar, Jeremy
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:51.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:47:58Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:47:58Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/5320
dc.identifier.contextkey13561362
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4861
dc.description.abstractThis essay aims to improve scholars’ understanding of the power dynamics that shape Supreme Court precedent. It argues that the Supreme Court bar heavily favors big business because it was built for that purpose. In response to the regulatory surge of the 1970s, corporate forces mobilized to better promote their interests before the justices. Like in the legislative sphere, they succeeded by relying on disciplined organizing. To raise demand for expert lawyers, companies founded interest groups that increased pressure on outside counsel and supplied them with extensive litigation support tools. Politically savvy business leaders then responded by creating private appellate practices molded after the Solicitor General’s Office.
dc.titleThe Making of the Supreme Court Bar: How Business Created a Solicitor General for the Private Sector
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:47:59Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/5320
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6329&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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