Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive

Abstract

As moderator of this distinguished panel, I shall try to set the scene. I shall argue that we must separate two important issues: the first, "separation of powers," raises issues of constitutional law; and the second, "Presidential control of agency decision making," raises issues of fair and effective government. In discussing each, I shall raise a few points designed to lead you to conclude that the two sets of issues do not have much to do with each other, that the second set of issues is far more important than the first, and that at the heart of the second set lies the question of governmental "coordination" of both substantive policy and relevant law. Whether I succeed or not, we shall then go on to hear from Judge Silberman, a judicial expert on separation of powers, from Professor Elliot, who, as General Counsel of EPA, can examine the coordination problem from an agency's point of view, and Mr. Eastland, a former high Justice Department official, familiar with its perspectives, problems and needs.