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dc.contributor.authorHansmann, Henry
dc.contributor.authorKraakman, Reinier
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:49.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:47:12Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:47:12Z
dc.date.issued1991-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/5035
dc.identifier.contextkey10610134
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4574
dc.description.abstractLimited liability in tort has been the prevailing rule for corporations in the United States, as elsewhere, for more than a century. This rule is generally acknowledged to create incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to avoid the full costs of their activities. Nevertheless, these incentives are conventionally assumed to be the price of securing efficient capital financing for corporations. Although several authors have recently proposed curtailing limited liability for certain classes of tort claims or for certain types of corporations in order to control its worst abuses, even the most radical of these proposals retains limited shareholder liability as the general rule.
dc.titleToward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:47:12Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/5035
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6058&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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