• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship
    • Faculty Scholarship Series
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship
    • Faculty Scholarship Series
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of openYLSCommunitiesPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    Display statistics

    2000 Monsanto Lecture in Tort Reform and Jurisprudence: Using Tort Settlements to Cartelize

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    2000_Monsanto_Lecture_in_Tort_ ...
    Size:
    706.5Kb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Author
    Ayres, Ian
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/452
    Abstract
    The tobacco company settlements, with four individual states (Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas) and the subsequent multistate agreement of November 1998, represent a legal innovation in cartelization technology. These new settlements allow state and local governments to act as cartel ringmasters—writing enforceable contracts which will predictably (i) raise the market price toward the monopoly level, (ii) split the supra-competitive profits with the government, and (iii) deter new entry. If such settlements are enforceable, states that have virtually no nexus with a set of industry producers—and in fact have not been injured by the industry—may nonetheless "race to the bottom" by suing and settling with an industry in order to enjoy a share of the cartel profits. Unfortunately, it is far from clear that such settlements currently run afoul of the law, and this Article accordingly recommends that federal legislation should prohibit the types of settlement structures that are most likely to produce cartel-like results. It has been understood that anticompetitive settlements can be produced when competitors sue each other in intellectual property or merger contexts. It has also been understood that captured state agencies may cartelize in-state producers of a particular product. But the individual state tobacco settlements suggest that a state may profitably cartelize out-of-state producers. States may settle fallacious tort claims to cartelize industries with which the state has no contacts whatsoever. The Minnesota tobacco settlement, for example, allowed out-of-state cigarette manufacturers to coordinate charging higher prices in exchange for reduced legal liability.
    Collections
    Faculty Scholarship Series

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2025)  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.