Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAckerman, Bruce
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:15.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:35:13Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:35:13Z
dc.date.issued1999-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/124
dc.identifier.contextkey1369982
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/443
dc.description.abstractWhy does the treatment of American constitutional politics presented in We the People depart so radically from models of constitutional deliberation developed in the type of constitutional economics pioneered by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock? The paper defines three premises that account for the divergence, and concludes by proposing an inquiry into constitutional design that requires insights from both traditions.
dc.titleConstitutional Economics/Constitutional Politics
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:35:13Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/124
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Constitutional_Economics_Const ...
Size:
43.35Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record