Chief Justices and Chief Executives: Some Thoughts on Jim Simon's Books

Abstract

It is an honor to be here with my dear friend Nadine Strossen and to be at an event celebratingJames Simon, who has been a real role model for me. Congratulations, Jim, on yet another amazing book. I say "yet another" because several of Jim's books are obviously connected, and these books, read as a whole, highlight some interesting structural tensions between the Chief Executive and the Chief Justice at various particularly fascinating moments in American history. To begin to see the pattern in Jim's work, think for a moment about the key constitutional clause limiting each presidential term to "four years." Prior to FDR, the President's tenure by tradition was limited to two terms-eight years. As with so many presidential traditions, this one began with George Washington, who stepped down after two terms. Had he wanted, he could have gotten elected to a third termand even to a fourth and fifth had he lived long enough. He was unanimously elected President in 1789, and unanimously re-elected in 1792. Every elector who cast a ballot voted for Washington. Prior to his resignation, it might have been widely believed that the presidency would end up being de facto a lifetime office, and that a tradition might emerge in which an incumbent would be routinely re-elected unless he somehow dishonored himself. Such was the emerging tradition at the state level: Massachusetts Governor John Hancock was routinely re-elected, as were Governors Jonathan Trumbull in Connecticut and William Livingston in New Jersey.