Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance (unabridged version)

Abstract

The transformation of the European Economic Community (EEC) stands as one of the remarkable political metamorphoses of modern times (Weiler 1991). Though some of its architects and proponents – like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and Altiero Spinelli – envisioned something akin to an eventual United States of Europe, the 1957 Treaty of Rome created an international organization with restricted authority, limited purposes, and a small membership. Today’s EU is an altogether different, quasi-constitutional, federal entity (Burley and Mattli 1993). It oversees a vast Single Market, but also a monetary union and a single currency, and it is pan-European in its scope. It produces common policies, and procedures for on-going rule-making, across a broad spectrum of domains touching on virtually every dimension of modern life. The European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have steadily augmented powers originally delegated to them by the Member States to position themselves as powerful agents of market and political integration (Tallberg 2000, 2002).