Some Observations on the Law of Evidence -- Memory
| dc.contributor.author | Slesinger, Donald | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hutchins, Robert | |
| dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:44.000 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:45:45Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:45:45Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1928-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
| dc.identifier | fss_papers/4545 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Robert M Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some observations on the law of evidence. Memory, 41 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 860 (1928). | |
| dc.identifier.contextkey | 4534435 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4048 | |
| dc.description.abstract | T HE common legal assumptions in regard to memory come most clearly to the surface in the rules governing present recollection revived, past recollection recorded, and cross-examination to impeach. Between the first two, sharp distinctions are drawn which result partly from the fact that a memorandum used to refresh recollection generally does not go to the jury as evidence - whereas a memorandum of past recollection does - and partly from the psychological theories of the courts. | |
| dc.subject | law | |
| dc.subject | memory | |
| dc.subject | evidence | |
| dc.title | Some Observations on the Law of Evidence -- Memory | |
| dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:45:46Z | |
| dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4545 | |
| dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5547&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |
