Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining
dc.contributor.author | Allen, Layman | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:44.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:45:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:45:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1956-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/4520 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Layman E Allen, Games bargaining: A proposed application of the theory of games to collective bargaining, 65 YALE LJ 660 (1955). | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 4233235 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4021 | |
dc.description.abstract | COLLECTIVE bargaining may perhaps be called an art; it has not yet become a science. But the approach of the sciences has brought to other fields dispassion; their methods have brought accuracy; their insights, illumination. And some of these benefits may be promised for collective bargaining by a new star in the firmament of the social sciences, the Theory of Games. A remarkable tool for the analysis of social behavior, the Theory of Games was conceived by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern ; and it has been adapted by John Nash to bargaining situations. Upon the foundation that Nash has provided, it may be that a new framework for collective bargaining can be erected. This comment is intended to suggest one such possible framework, a system that will be designated "Games Bargaining." | |
dc.subject | collective bargaining | |
dc.subject | games theory | |
dc.title | Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:45:41Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4520 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5522&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |