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dc.contributor.authorAllen, Layman
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:44.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:45:41Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:45:41Z
dc.date.issued1956-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/4520
dc.identifier.citationLayman E Allen, Games bargaining: A proposed application of the theory of games to collective bargaining, 65 YALE LJ 660 (1955).
dc.identifier.contextkey4233235
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/4021
dc.description.abstractCOLLECTIVE bargaining may perhaps be called an art; it has not yet become a science. But the approach of the sciences has brought to other fields dispassion; their methods have brought accuracy; their insights, illumination. And some of these benefits may be promised for collective bargaining by a new star in the firmament of the social sciences, the Theory of Games. A remarkable tool for the analysis of social behavior, the Theory of Games was conceived by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern ; and it has been adapted by John Nash to bargaining situations. Upon the foundation that Nash has provided, it may be that a new framework for collective bargaining can be erected. This comment is intended to suggest one such possible framework, a system that will be designated "Games Bargaining."
dc.subjectcollective bargaining
dc.subjectgames theory
dc.titleGames Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:45:41Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4520
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5522&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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